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THE CORE OF AN UNEASY CASE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.
∗ 
The best case for judicial review in politically and morally healthy societies does not 
depend (as is commonly believed) on the idea that courts are more likely than 
legislatures to define vague rights correctly.  It rests instead on the subtly different 
ground that legislatures and courts should both be enlisted to protect fundamental rights 
and, accordingly, that both should have veto powers over legislation that might 
reasonably be thought to violate such rights.  
In developing this case for judicial review, Professor Fallon proceeds by confronting 
recent, influential, philosophically probing arguments against judicial review by 
Professor Jeremy Waldron.  Professor Fallon concedes arguendo that, as Professor 
Waldron argues, courts are no better than legislatures at defining rights correctly, but 
maintains that the crucial question is not whether courts or legislatures are less likely to 
err, but which kinds of errors are most important to avoid — those that result in rights 
being overprotected or those that result in rights being infringed.  Insofar as judicial 
review can be designed to prevent errors in just one direction, involving failures to 
protect rights adequately, then judicial review may be supportable even if courts are no 
better than legislatures at identifying rights correctly.  Professor Fallon also argues, 
contra Professor Waldron, that judicial review can actually contribute to the political 
legitimacy of an otherwise democratic scheme of government when the demands of 
political legitimacy are understood correctly. 
  Professor Fallon’s revised justification for judicial review, which does not presume 
courts to be better than legislatures at identifying fundamental rights, has important 
implications for how judicial review should be practiced.  It implies a diminished role 
for courts in cases in which fundamental rights are pitted against one another, such that 
the overenforcement of one entails the underenforcement of the other.  It also implies 
that courts should withhold review when legislatures conscientiously seek to protect one 
fundamental right without plausibly threatening another. 
or a long season, the desirability of judicial review of legislation 
was a complacent assumption of American constitutional, political, 
and moral thought.  A vigorous debate percolated about how courts 
should interpret the Constitution, but not much serious discussion   
addressed whether judicial review should exist at all.  Now matters 
have changed.  Although debate continues concerning how courts 
should make constitutional decisions, distinguished critics have begun 
to argue for a fundamental rethinking of the role of courts in a democ-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  ∗  Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School.  I am grateful to 
Heather Gerken, Don Herzog, Allan Hutchinson, Daryl Levinson, Frank Michelman, Martha 
Minow, Warren Postman, John Pottow, Richard Primus, Eric Rakowski, Sam Scheffler, Mike 
Seidman, and Adrian Vermeule, and to participants in workshops at the University of Michigan 
Law School and UC Berkeley School of Law, for extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts.  
Elizabeth Barchas provided outstanding research assistance. 
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ratic culture such as ours.1  Some advocate the total abolition of judi-
cial review.2 
Having heard the critics, I now believe that the affirmative case for 
judicial review needs to be partially revised if judicial review is to be 
defended successfully on the moral high ground of liberal political the-
ory.  In a nutshell, the best case for judicial review in politically and 
morally healthy societies does not rest (as has often been asserted) on 
the idea that courts are more likely than legislatures to make correct 
decisions about how to define vague rights of the kind commonly in-
cluded in bills of rights — on notions, for example, that courts are pe-
culiarly well designed to function as “forum[s] of principle.”3  The best 
case, as Frank Cross also has argued,4 rests instead on the subtly dif-
ferent ground that legislatures and courts should both be enlisted in 
protecting fundamental rights, and that both should have veto powers 
over legislation that might reasonably be thought to violate such 
rights. 
A suggestive, albeit not perfect, analogy comes from the federal 
jury system in criminal cases, under which a defendant cannot be con-
victed without the unanimous agreement of the jury,5 and each of the 
twelve jurors must vote to acquit unless persuaded that the defendant 
has been proven guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt.”6  If the concern 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  1  See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTION-
ALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
  2  See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING  THE CONSTITUTION AWAY  FROM  THE COURTS 
154–76 (1999). 
  3  See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 69–71 (1985) (characterizing the Su-
preme Court as “the forum of principle”). 
  4  Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 
1529, 1576 (2000) (arguing that judicial review may be justified even if a judiciary lacks “any in-
trinsic advantage in constitutional interpretation and enforcement” because “adding an additional 
check on government action will enhance the liberty the Bill of Rights offers”). 
  5  The analogy of multiple jurors having vetoes to the vetoing effect of judicial review is ad-
mittedly not perfect.  Whereas the Supreme Court can conclusively nullify an enactment that it 
believes to be unconstitutional (at least in the absence of a constitutional amendment), a single 
dissenting juror cannot absolutely block a conviction, due to the possibility of a retrial in which a 
conviction might subsequently be obtained.  But see Jeffrey Rosen, After ‘One Angry Woman,’ 
1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F.  179, 191 (reciting conclusions of a study in which “[o]nly 34 percent of 
[hung jury cases were] actually retried” and asserting that among “11-to-1 hung-jury cases that 
are retried, juries convict only 58 percent of the time, hanging again or acquitting in 42 percent of 
the cases” (emphases omitted)).  In addition, where judicial review operates as a safeguard only of 
the interests that would be harmed by a legislative enactment, the requirement of jury unanimity 
applies to what otherwise would be majority decisions to acquit, as well as to convict, a defen-
dant.  See Jason D. Reichelt, Standing Alone: Conformity, Coercion, and the Protection of the 
Holdout Juror, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569, 570 (2007) (“The federal criminal trial system and 
every state, with the exception of two, require unanimous verdicts for conviction or acquittal in 
felony trials.”). 
  6  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (quoting Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 
493 (1895)).    
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were simply to get correct judgments about whether the accused had 
committed a crime, decisions by majority vote, pursuant to a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard, would produce more accurate out-
comes.7  Instead, we skew the system in a pro-defendant direction 
based on the premise that errors resulting in mistaken convictions of 
the innocent are morally worse, and thus more important to avoid, 
than erroneous acquittals of the guilty.8  In other words, we care less 
about minimizing the overall number of errors than about minimizing 
the errors in a particular direction — a situation that might also obtain 
with respect to judgments involving individual rights.9 
In developing this case for judicial review, my argument proceeds 
by confronting and then refuting the most profound challenge to judi-
cial review that has achieved prominence in the law reviews — Jeremy 
Waldron’s argument in The Core of the Case Against Judicial Re-
view.10  In that article, Waldron first debunks what he calls the “out-
come-related” argument on which he takes the affirmative case for ju-
dicial review to depend — the argument that courts are more likely 
than legislatures to identify individual rights correctly.  In any rea-
sonably democratic society that satisfies four “quite demanding”11 but 
“not unrealistic”12 conditions,13 he argues, there is no reason to think 
courts more likely than legislatures to determine unerringly what 
rights people actually have14 (on the assumption, which I too shall 
adopt for purposes of this Article, that debates about constitutional 
rights at bottom are or ought to be debates about moral rights).15  The 
most important of these conditions are that legislators take questions 
involving individual rights seriously and that “reasonable disagree-
ment” exists about their correct resolution.16  (Waldron does not chal-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  7  See L ARRY  LAUDAN,  TRUTH,  ERROR,  AND  CRIMINAL  LAW:  AN  ESSAY  IN  LEGAL 
EPISTEMOLOGY  29–30 ( 2006) (examining traditional principles of criminal law to show that 
standards such as the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are designed to ensure that 
errors “will be predominantly false acquittals rather than false convictions”). 
  8  See id. at 63 (collecting authorities that so assert). 
  9  See Cross, supra note 4, at 1592 (arguing that “false negatives (underenforcement of consti-
tutional freedoms) are both more serious and more likely to occur than false positives (overen-
forcement of constitutional freedoms)” and calling “for a decision rule that does not necessarily 
minimize all mistakes but rather minimizes false negatives”). 
  10  Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Y ALE L.J. 1346 (2006) 
[hereinafter Waldron, The Core Case].  Waldron has advanced similar arguments before, see, e.g., 
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 211–312 (1999), but he writes in the most re-
cent article, “I am not satisfied that I have [previously] stated in a clear and uncluttered way what 
the basic objection [to judicial review] is.”  Waldron, The Core Case, supra, at 1352–53. 
  11  Waldron so characterizes them.  Waldron, The Core Case, supra note 10, at 1401. 
  12  Id. at 1402. 
  13  For discussion of those conditions, see infra Part I. 
  14 Waldron,  The Core Case, supra note 10, at 1360. 
  15  See id. at 1367, 1385–86 & n.110. 
  16  See id. at 1364–69.    
2008]  AN UNEASY CASE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW  1697 
lenge judicial review of action by executive and bureaucratic offi-
cials,17 who may often have less opportunity for debate and delibera-
tion before they must act in ways that might put rights at risk.)  When 
these conditions are met, Waldron maintains, the fact that courts and 
legislatures differ in their assessments provides no ground for thinking 
courts more likely to be right. 
This much of Waldron’s argument I am inclined to accept, at least 
for the sake of argument.  Many if not most arguments that courts 
should be presumed better than legislatures at determining whether 
legislation violates individual rights have a troublingly elitist cast — 
especially if one follows Waldron in assuming that the kinds of rights 
commonly incorporated into bills of rights are moral rights.  Virtually 
without exception, judges and Justices are well-educated members of 
the upper or upper-middle classes who have been socialized to accept 
professional norms.18  The preference for having a small number of 
lawyers in robes resolve contested questions about individual rights 
almost inevitably reflects one or another species of antipopulism,19 fre-
quently coupled with highly idealized portraits of the few who wield 
judicial power. 
In expressing unease about the elitism implicit in traditional de-
fenses of judicial review, I do not mean to suggest that courts have no 
institutional advantages in resolving disputed rights questions.20  Per-
haps most important, processes of judicial review can be and often are 
structured to permit courts to address challenges to the constitutional-
ity of legislation only after potentially unforeseen implications have 
manifested themselves.  Even in cases in which the passage of time 
and the accrual of further information help, however, judicial decisions 
could be made subject to legislative override, with the effect that this 
particular judicial advantage would largely disappear.21 
Moreover, the judicial branch may labor under some relative dis-
advantages too — at least if we assume that judicial review will be 
practiced more or less as it traditionally has been.  As Waldron points 
out, courts have an understandable tendency to confront issues that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  17  See id. at 1353–54. 
  18  See John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Inde-
pendence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 369 (1999) (noting that judges “are likely to bring to their work 
the perceptions of an upper middle class, educated, largely male, and largely white elite”); see also 
Paul Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 664 (1985). 
  19  See K RAMER,  supra note 1, at 241–46; RICHARD  D.  PARKER,  “HERE,  THE  PEOPLE 
RULE” 56–58 (1994). 
  20  Waldron does not maintain the contrary.  See Waldron, The Core Case, supra note 10, at 
1376. 
  21  Waldron acknowledges that courts may have an initial advantage in assessing as-applied 
challenges to legislation, but he apparently believes that the balance of argument supports only a 
“weak” form of judicial review in which a court may declare that important issues of rights are at 
stake, while leaving responsibility for resolving those issues with the legislature.  Id. at 1370.    
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are fundamentally moral in legalistic, logic-chopping terms in which 
head-on engagement with the contending moral considerations often is 
almost wholly washed out.22  Roe v. Wade23 stands as Exhibit One for 
this proposition,24 but other examples abound. 
In response to claims that courts often grapple clumsily with ap-
peals to moral principle, some would undoubtedly reject Waldron’s 
premise that the kinds of rights included in bills of rights typically are 
moral rights, not historically bounded references to be interpreted in 
accord with the original understanding of constitutional language.  But 
he advances a general philosophical argument, not one about the mer-
its of originalism as an American constitutional theory, and his chal-
lenge deserves to be answered on its own terms.  In any event, consti-
tutional adjudication in the United States has enough nonoriginalist 
elements that Waldron’s arguments bear on U.S. practice and on 
whether that practice ought to be reformed even if — as I agree — 
U.S. courts do not regard constitutional rights entirely as moral rights. 
Having dismissed the outcome-based case in favor of judicial re-
view, Waldron advances “process-based” arguments purporting to es-
tablish that judicial review is unfair and “illegitimate” in any society in 
which his four conditions hold.25  In essence, he claims that judicial 
review deprives political majorities of the right to democratic self-
governance on important issues.  This process-based objection might 
possibly be overcome, he acknowledges, if courts were likely to be bet-
ter than legislatures at resolving disputed questions about moral 
rights.26  But having adjudged the outcome-related case for judicial 
review to be “at best inconclusive”27 in societies defined by his four as-
sumptions, Waldron concludes that the process-based or legitimacy ar-
gument in favor of majority decision by legislatures ought to prevail 
and that judicial review should be abolished.28  If judicial review could 
ever be defended successfully, he argues, it would need to be as a cor-
rective for “pathologies” in a society’s culture or political system.29 
Waldron is a distinguished political theorist.  He has no partisan ax 
to grind.  His claims have achieved influence already, and they will 
undoubtedly prove influential in the future. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  22  See id. at 1383–85. 
  23  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
  24  See Waldron, The Core Case, supra note 10, at 1383 (noting that the fifty-page opinion in 
Roe devoted only a few paragraphs to the moral issues at stake and that “the ‘reasoning’ is 
thread-bare”). 
  25  See id. at 1386–95. 
  26  See id. at 1375 (acknowledging the “Gordian knot” that would exist if outcome-related rea-
sons supported, while process-related reasons opposed, judicial review). 
  27  Id. 
  28  See id. at 1375–76. 
  29  Id. at 1406; see id. at 1352, 1401–05.    
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As I shall demonstrate, however, a fallacy pervades The Core of the 
Case Against Judicial Review.  Even if courts would be no more likely 
than the legislature to decide questions of individual rights correctly in 
a society in which legislators took rights seriously, Waldron’s conclu-
sion that outcome-based reasons fail to support judicial review would 
not follow.  As I have suggested, his argument would not go through if 
some rights deserve to be protected by multiple safeguards or veto 
powers.  If errors of underprotection — that is, infringements of rights 
— are more morally serious than errors of overprotection, and if a few 
other plausible conditions obtain, then there could be outcome-related 
reasons to prefer a system with judicial review to one without it. 
Waldron’s process-based argument also collapses insofar as there 
are outcome-related reasons to support judicial review.  The fairness of 
procedures depends crucially on the ends that they seek to accomplish.  
If judicial review promotes morally better outcomes than would exclu-
sive legislative definitions of disputed rights, then reliance on judicial 
review is not unfair, nor does it, as Waldron maintains, necessarily lack 
“legitimacy.”30 
As Waldron uses the term, a political regime is legitimate insofar as 
its design and composition provide good reasons for those who dis-
agree with particular laws and decisions nevertheless to respect and 
obey them.31  In arguing against judicial review, Waldron frequently 
equates “political legitimacy” with “democratic legitimacy.”  When de-
cisions emerge from processes in which everyone has a voice and a 
vote, he argues, even the losers have reason to accede to the outcome 
on the ground that their views were fairly taken into account.32  Al-
though Waldron is correct that democratic legitimacy is important, he 
fails to acknowledge that political legitimacy — which is a broader 
concept — can have multiple sources.  Even if judicial review is rela-
tively lacking in specifically democratic legitimacy, one good reason for 
citizens to respect political decisions with which they disagree is that 
those decisions issue from institutions that are well designed to safe-
guard individual rights.  If judicial review reduces the likelihood that 
important rights will be infringed, then it may actually enhance, rather 
than undermine, a governmental regime’s overall political legitimacy. 
Although my arguments against Waldron add up to an affirmative 
case in favor of judicial review, my defense is sufficiently qualified and 
contingent to qualify as “uneasy.”  I argue that if certain conditions ex-
ist — as I am inclined to believe that they do and as Waldron does not 
demonstrate to be impossible or even unlikely — then judicial review 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  30  See id. at 1386–93. 
  31  See id. at 1386–87. 
  32  See id. at 1386–89.    
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would be desirable.  Among the most centrally important premises 
supporting the case for judicial review are these: (1) Even if courts are 
not better overall at identifying rights violations than are legislatures, 
courts have a distinctive perspective that makes them more likely than 
legislatures to apprehend serious risks of rights violations in some 
kinds of cases.  (2) Legislative action is more likely to violate funda-
mental rights than legislative inaction.  (3) Some rights are more im-
portant than others and, accordingly, are more deserving of protections 
against infringement.  (4) A system of judicial review can be so de-
signed that the moral costs of such overenforcement of rights as judi-
cial review would produce will likely be lower than the moral costs 
that would result from such underenforcement of rights as would oc-
cur in the absence of judicial review. 
Although I would guess that all of these premises are satisfied in 
most western liberal democracies, I do not attempt to prove that they 
actually hold, either in the United States or elsewhere — a job that 
would be Herculean at the very least.  In this Article it will be enough 
if I can, first, develop a case for judicial review that does not depend 
on the premise that courts are more likely than legislatures to define 
rights correctly and, second, call attention to the kinds of assumptions 
on which I believe that any argument either for or against judicial re-
view needs to depend.  I shall also, near the end, venture some 
thoughts on how the case for judicial review that I make in this Article 
would influence the form that judicial review ought to take. 
The Article unfolds as follows.  Part I lays out Waldron’s argument 
that the balance of outcome-related reasons provides inadequate sup-
port to justify judicial review in nonpathological societies.  Part II then 
criticizes Waldron’s reasoning about the balance of outcome-related 
considerations and, in the course of doing so, develops an affirmative 
case for judicial review.  Assuming for the sake of argument that judi-
cial review would not increase the number of cases in which questions 
of rights were decided correctly, Part II supports judicial review as a 
means of minimizing the number of cases in which underenforcement 
occurs.  Part III argues, contra Waldron, that judicial review can actu-
ally contribute to the political legitimacy of a scheme of otherwise de-
mocratic government when the demands of political legitimacy are 
understood correctly.  Part IV offers a brief, tentative exploration of 
how judicial review ought to be practiced if courts were not presumed 
better than legislatures at identifying rights, but viewed instead as 
providing a potentially costly but also potentially valuable veto power 
over rights-threatening legislation.  This Part argues that courts should 
exercise only the most deferential review or should even withhold re-
view altogether in cases in which the legislature conscientiously seeks 
to protect one set of fundamental rights without plausibly threatening 
another (as may frequently happen in the United States when Con-   
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gress legislates pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
Part V supplies a brief conclusion. 
I.  WALDRON’S ARGUMENT THAT OUTCOME-RELATED REASONS 
ARE INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT JUDICIAL REVIEW 
In mounting his case against judicial review, Waldron makes four 
central assumptions.  If these assumptions hold, he argues, then the 
case for judicial review will fail.33  Although I shall assume for pur-
poses of argument that all of Waldron’s assumptions obtain, it is im-
portant to state them clearly in order to understand their role in his 
“core case.”  It is also important to understand how Waldron’s care-
fully stated assumptions relate to his other arguments that outcome-
based reasons provide no clear support for judicial review. 
A.  Waldron’s Assumptions 
First, Waldron assumes that the society’s democratic institutions, 
including its legislature, are in “reasonably good working order.”34  In 
other words, the society has tolerably good even if not perfect institu-
tions of political democracy. 
Second, the society has a relatively well-functioning judicial system 
capable of applying the law in an impartial even if not perfect way.35 
Third, the society believes in and is committed to protecting indi-
vidual rights.36  There are few if any skeptics who regard the idea of 
moral rights as nonsensical.  Rather, the society, or most of its mem-
bers, believe that in principle questions involving claims of individual 
rights have correct answers. 
Fourth, despite the society’s commitment to the idea of individual 
rights, widespread, reasonable disagreement exists about what rights 
people have.37  For example, people disagree about whether the right 
to religious freedom encompasses a right to be excused from obedience 
to otherwise generally applicable laws, about whether freedom of 
speech subsumes a right to donate vast sums of speech-generating 
money to political campaigns, and about whether there is a right to 
abortion. 
B.  Which Assumptions Do What Work? 
Given his four assumptions, Waldron believes courts no more likely 
than legislatures to arrive at the correct answer to questions of what 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  33  Id. at 1360. 
  34  Id.; see id. at 1361–62. 
  35  See id. at 1363–64. 
  36  See id. at 1364–66. 
  37  See id. at 1366–69.    
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rights people have.  As I have stated already, I am prepared to accept 
for purposes of argument Waldron’s narrow conclusion that courts 
would be no more likely than legislatures to identify rights correctly if 
all of his assumptions held.  (This, obviously, is a very big “if.”  I mean 
to leave open the question whether particular legislatures are in “rea-
sonably good working order” with respect to their solicitude for rights.)  
Nevertheless, it is worth parsing Waldron’s argument with care, for he 
fails to make explicit which of the premises carry which parts of the 
argumentative burden that The Core of the Case Against Judicial Re-
view assumes. 
On one possible interpretation, Waldron’s fourth assumption, in-
volving reasonable disagreement about the content of rights, does most 
or all of the work of establishing that courts could not be better than 
legislatures at deciding correctly what rights people have.  If people 
reasonably disagree about rights, we might interpret Waldron as argu-
ing, then we must explain not only how they disagree, but also how it 
is reasonable for them to disagree; and if disagreement is reasonable 
because no epistemically reliable method of identifying rights exists, as 
he may seem to suggest,38 then it is impossible to say that one deci-
sionmaker is more likely than another to decide correctly.  In short, 
once the reasonableness of disagreement is acknowledged, it follows 
inexorably that there can be no outcome-related reason to support ju-
dicial review. 
Although it is possible to imagine an opponent of judicial review 
relying on the assumption of reasonable disagreement in this way, I do 
not understand Waldron to do so in The Core of the Case Against Ju-
dicial Review.39  Waldron states his four assumptions early on, but 
when he later considers and rejects three arguments that courts might 
be better than legislatures at identifying rights — that courts are likely 
to do better (1) because courts focus their deliberations on concrete 
cases, not abstractions, (2) because courts have special competence in 
interpreting legal texts such as bills of rights, and (3) because courts 
carry an obligation to provide reasoned explanations of their deci-
sions40 — he nowhere suggests that reasonable disagreement suffices to 
defeat these arguments.  Rather, assuming that questions involving 
rights have correct answers, he maintains that claims for courts’ com-
paratively greater competence fail either because courts do not in fact 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  38  See id. at 1368 (assuming “that our condition is not one in which the truth of the matter 
[about moral questions] discloses itself in ways that are not reasonably deniable”). 
  39  This may be Waldron’s position in other writing.  See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Irrele-
vance of Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 158 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). 
  40  See Waldron, The Core Case, supra note 10, at 1379–86.  See also Cross, supra note 4, at 
1536–50 (criticizing these traditional defenses of judicial review).    
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possess specifically asserted advantages or, alternatively, because any 
judicial advantage is offset by a judicial disadvantage.41 
Nor do I believe that the mere fact of reasonable disagreement 
could persuade anyone who was not a rights-skeptic of the impossibil-
ity of one institution’s being better than another at getting the right 
answer to questions involving individual rights.42  F or me to belie ve 
that reasonable disagreement about rights is possible, while continuing 
to believe in a nonskeptical way that people nevertheless possess par-
ticular rights, I have to believe that I have identified the pertinent 
moral truth in a relatively, even if not perfectly, epistemically reliable 
way.  If, for example, I am a utilitarian, then I must believe in the rela-
tive reliability of the processes of reasoning that led me to adopt utili-
tarianism in preference to Kantianism and other rival theories — even 
if many reasonable people disagree in light of what John Rawls called 
the “burdens of judgment” that inescapably attend this conclusion.43  
Similarly, if I think that the facts are pertinent to some or all moral 
judgments, yet believe nonskeptically in the validity of some claims of 
moral right, then I must think that there is a relatively epistemically 
reliable way of determining the relevant facts. 
It lies far beyond my ambition in this Article to identify which 
moral theory, if any, is correct, or to determine how any kind of fact 
would most reliably be determined.  My only point here is that ac-
knowledgment of reasonable disagreement does not preclude reasoned 
judgments about what is right and wrong or about how rights are 
most reliably identified.  And from this point, another follows: If peo-
ple can reasonably believe not only that there are truths about rights, 
but also that there are relatively epistemically reliable means of dis-
covering those truths, then the fact of reasonable disagreement cannot, 
by itself, prove that one institution could not be better than another at 
reaching correct outcomes.  If, for example, courts routinely reasoned 
from better supported moral premises or used more reliable delibera-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  41  Among the advantages of legislatures, he includes their tendency to focus directly on under-
lying moral considerations, see Waldron, The Core Case, supra note 10, at 1384–85, whereas courts 
become preoccupied with issues of textual exegesis and interpretive methodology, see id. at 1381–
82. 
  42  Waldron’s core case against judicial review involves societies in which the rights-skeptical 
position is merely “an outlier.”  Id. at 1365. 
  43  JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 54–58 (1993).  Rawls used the term to refer to “the 
many hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) exercise of our powers of reason and 
judgment,” id. at 56, which give rise to “reasonable disagreement,” id. at 55, and explain why “it 
is not to be expected that conscientious persons with full powers of reason, even after free discus-
sion, will all arrive at the same conclusion,” id. at 58.  To say that a decision is subject to the bur-
dens of judgment is not to say that there can be no right answer, see id. (noting that some rea-
sonably disputable judgments “may be true”), but it is to acknowledge that knock-down 
arguments cannot always be expected.    
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tive procedures than did legislatures, then courts could be expected to 
reach more accurate conclusions.44 
On a better interpretation of Waldron’s argument, his first and 
third assumptions — that legislative institutions are in reasonably 
good order and that the society and its members, including its legisla-
tors, are seriously committed to protecting individual rights — must do 
the principal work of supporting his conclusion that there is no suffi-
cient outcome-based reason to want judicial review.  On this interpre-
tation, the key point is that judges have no greater capacity for moral 
insight, nor do they follow processes of deliberation more likely to lead 
them to insight, than morally conscientious legislators. 
II.  PREFERRED RIGHTS AND OUTCOME-RELATED  
REASONS TO SUPPORT JUDICIAL REVIEW 
As I have said, I shall stipulate for purposes of argument that if 
Waldron’s first and third assumptions were to hold, and that if the sole 
question were whether courts or legislatures are more likely to identify 
rights correctly, there would not be sufficient outcome-based reasons to 
adjudge courts conclusively better than legislatures.45  Crucially, how-
ever, whether courts or legislatures will do better at identifying moral 
rights correctly is not the sole question to be resolved in arguing for or 
against judicial review.  Once an alternative question is put on the ta-
ble, involving whether one or both institutions should be charged with 
rights protection, Waldron’s argument loses its potency, and a powerful 
variant on the traditional case for judicial review emerges. 
A.  Distinguishing Errors of Underenforcement  
and Overenforcement of Individual Rights 
Although judicial review permits courts to invalidate legislation, it 
ordinarily imposes no impediment to the legislature’s respecting or 
protecting individual rights by refraining from actions that it thinks 
would violate them.  In so saying, I put to one side the well-known ar-
gument of James Bradley Thayer that the availability of judicial re-
view predictably diminishes legislatures’ willingness to deliberate seri-
ously and independently about questions involving rights.46  W i t h i n  
the bounds of argument that Waldron’s premises define, I take 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  44  I do not mean to suggest that only moral realists, who believe in objectively right answers to 
moral questions, could have good reasons to support judicial review.  As I shall explain below, 
relativists or pragmatists could also be warranted in favoring judicial review. 
  45  My actual view is that courts would be more likely to reach correct decisions at least about 
whether general legislation violates individual rights as applied to particular cases, some of which 
the legislature may not have anticipated. 
  46  See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 155–56 (1893).    
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Thayer’s view to be ruled out by the assumption that a society’s de-
mocratic institutions, including its legislature, take rights seriously.   
Quite apart from argumentative stipulations, it would seem to me to 
be dramatically imprudent for a society that thought its legislature did 
not currently take rights seriously to abolish judicial review in hopeful 
anticipation that the legislature would thereafter change its ways.47 
In any event, if we assume that the prospect of judicial review cre-
ates no ex ante impediment to a legislature’s respecting individual 
rights, the question to be addressed in assessing judicial review is not 
necessarily whether courts or legislatures would perform better at 
identifying rights if we had to charge only one institution with this 
task.  The question, instead, is whether a society might have good out-
come-related reasons to enlist both the legislature and the courts in 
protecting individual rights.48  Or, to put the question slightly differ-
ently, might a society reasonably want to create multiple veto points so 
that governmental action could not occur if either a court or the legis-
lature thought that the action would violate individual rights?49 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  47  But cf. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 66 (acknowledging that concern for the Constitution cur-
rently ranks low among congressional concerns and asserting that “this situation may have arisen 
in part because of judicial review”); id. at 194 (suggesting that “[p]erhaps it is time” to abolish ju-
dicial review). 
  48  Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Virtual Logrolling: How the Court, Congress, 
and the States Multiply Rights, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1545, 1547 (1995) (arguing that “separation of 
powers, federalism, and judicial review foster a lawmaking regime that produces multiple oppor-
tunities for rights creation and fewer opportunities for rights negation,” which results in “the mul-
tiplication of rights over time”); Douglas Laycock, Federalism as a Structural Threat to Liberty, 
22 H ARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 75 (1998) (describing the Fourteenth Amendment’s “multiple 
enforcement mechanisms,” including the judiciary, Congress, the Executive, and the states, and 
the possibility that if any one branch of government took action, “the Fourteenth Amendment 
would be safe”). 
  49  See Cross, supra note 4, at 1576 (explaining that “the multiple vetoes concept relies on the 
benefit of adding judicial review on top of congressional and executive action”).  Other scholars 
have argued that regardless of whether courts are more likely to identify rights correctly than are 
legislatures, judicial review might be defended on the ground that it creates an additional barrier 
to the enactment or enforcement of legislation.  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of 
Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 846 (arguing 
that views on judicial independence may depend on what people think about “the number of hur-
dles that must be crossed before the state can impose its commands on individual citizens”); Julia 
D. Mahoney, Kelo’s Legacy: Eminent Domain and the Future of Property Rights, 2005 SUP. CT. 
REV. 103, 129–31 (arguing that “even if judges have inferior ability to calculate the social costs 
and benefits of eminent domain,” judicial review can “add value” by providing “multiple veto 
points in rearranging property rights”); Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How 
the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 V A. L. REV. 1649, 1704 & n.182 (2005) (arguing that 
the “chief value of judicial review” in cases in which the court may not be better than the legisla-
ture at balancing costs and benefits is “that the judiciary may serve as a second negative, and one 
less susceptible to the temporary excesses of popular sentiment that can infect legislatures”).    
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Systems of “strong” judicial review, which Waldron inveighs 
against,50 institutionalize an affirmative answer to this question.  In 
doing so, however, they need not depend on the premise that a court is 
more likely than the legislature to rule correctly on whether any par-
ticular claimant truly possesses a right.  Rather, a stronger case for ju-
dicial review in morally and politically nonpathological societies rests 
on the assumption that if either a court or the legislature believes that 
an action would infringe individual rights, the government should be 
barred from taking it. 
Two analogies suggest the force of this argument.  One, to which I 
have alluded already, comes from the jury system and the demand   
for unanimous verdicts in federal criminal cases.51  The reason to re-
quire unanimous verdicts — as, additionally, to apply a beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard of proof52 — is not that this requirement 
will maximize the number of correct determinations of whether ac-
cused persons committed alleged offenses.  For that purpose, a decision 
by majority vote coupled with a lower standard of proof would serve 
better.  Nevertheless, we may reasonably believe that we have a good 
outcome-related reason to give every juror a veto over what otherwise 
would be a guilty verdict and, what is more, to ask each to exercise 
her veto power unless satisfied that the government has proven the de-
fendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  The reason, obviously, is 
that errors that result in the conviction of the innocent are more mor-
ally disturbing than errors that result in acquittals of the guilty.53  In 
light of that assessment, we have adopted a system that minimizes the 
most morally grievous errors, even if that system leads to more of the 
less grievous errors, and indeed to more total errors, than would an al-
ternative.  Just as there may be outcome-related reasons to prefer a 
system that minimizes erroneous convictions of the innocent, so there 
may be outcome-related reasons to prefer a system that minimizes vio-
lations of individual rights — even at the cost of increasing the num-
ber of cases in which individual rights claims are mistakenly upheld.54 
An even closer analogy involves the multipart system of lawmaking 
created by the United States Constitution, which has parallels in the 
constitutions of some other nations.  As a matter of structural design, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  50  See Waldron, The Core Case, supra note 10, at 1354–59 (distinguishing “strong” judicial re-
view, which authorizes courts to nullify or modify statutes, from “weak” judicial review, under 
which courts can signal their concerns that statutes violate rights but cannot decline to enforce 
statutes on that ground). 
  51  See supra pp. 1695–96. 
  52  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). 
  53  See LAUDAN, supra note 7, at 63 (collecting authorities that so assert).  
  54  See Roosevelt, supra note 49, at 1661 (explaining that courts may adopt decision rules in an 
attempt to reduce certain types of errors, rather than to “minimize the total number of errors 
without reference to kind”).    
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the Constitution makes it difficult for majorities to legislate.  Separate 
majorities of both houses of a bicameral legislature are required, and 
the President also possesses a veto power.55  The underlying premise, 
plainly, is that it is presumptively worse for legislation to be enacted 
than not enacted, largely because of the threat that legislation might 
violate individual rights, and that multiple veto points should there-
fore exist.56 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  55  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
  56  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”); Samuel Freeman, Constitutional Democracy 
and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review, 9 LAW & PHIL. 327, 352–55 (1991). 
  A third analogy — on which I am inclined to place less weight, because it may tend to presup-
pose (rather than help to establish) the desirability of judicial review — involves a number of ju-
dicially crafted rules or doctrines embodying the premise that it is better for constitutional rights 
to be overenforced than for them to be underenforced.  Among the best known of these is the rule 
of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), under which a confession may not be introduced in a 
criminal trial unless the defendant was apprised  
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a 
court of law, that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot af-
ford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. 
Id. at 479.  Miranda overenforces the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against compelled self-
incrimination, for not every confession elicited in the absence of a Miranda warning would neces-
sarily be coerced.  But the Supreme Court evidently determined that it was too difficult for courts 
to identify impermissible coercion on a case-by-case basis, and it opted for overenforcement in 
preference to the underenforcement that was likely to result if the burden rested on criminal de-
fendants to prove that their wills were overborne. 
  A preference for rights to be overenforced rather than underenforced also finds expression in 
First Amendment cases affirming that “[f]reedoms of expression require breathing space.”  Hustler 
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (quoting Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 
U.S.  767,  772 ( 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Under the First Amendment over-
breadth doctrine, for example, courts will facially invalidate statutes that apply to some constitu-
tionally unprotected speech, such as obscenity or fighting words, but that also extend to some pro-
tected speech and are “substantially overbroad.”  See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making 
Sense of Overbreadth, 100 Y ALE L.J. 853 (1991).  When statutes are overbroad, courts could con-
tinue to enforce them against unprotected speech and hold them unconstitutional only as applied 
to speech that is constitutionally protected.  But the Supreme Court has said that First Amend-
ment rights are so precious that facial invalidation is appropriate to avert the “chilling” of pro-
tected speech, see, e.g., Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 576 (1987), 
even though an overenforcement of speech rights occurs as a result.  For discussion of other doc-
trines that deliberately “overprotect” rights based on a calculation that it is better for them to be 
overenforced than underenforced, see, for example, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable 
Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1303–06 (2006), and see also 
Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
  If courts sometimes overenforce constitutional rights, it is at least equally true and important 
that they sometimes underenforce constitutional rights as well.  See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, 
Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 
(1978); see also Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, supra, at 
1299–303.  Even when constitutional norms are judicially underenforced, however, the availabil-
ity of even limited judicial enforcement will presumably result in fewer cases of rights being in-
fringed than if sole responsibility for defining and enforcing rights were confided in the   
legislature.     
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It bears emphasis that one need not be a moral realist in order to 
see the force of these analogies or to accept the argument that they 
support.  Relativists and skeptics can, and frequently do, retain first-
order moral views — personal convictions about right and wrong on 
the basis of which they are prepared to act — with their relativism or 
skepticism pertaining only to second-order questions involving the 
foundations for those views.57  It is therefore wholly possible for a sec-
ond-order relativist or skeptic to believe, as a matter of first-order 
conviction, that it is more morally troublesome for rights to be under-
enforced than overenforced and to support judicial review based on 
this judgment — just as it is possible, and indeed presumably familiar, 
for second-order relativists to endorse the requirements of unanimous 
jury verdicts and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Although it is reasonable in principle to believe it better to err on 
the side of too much rather than too little protection of rights under 
conditions of reasonable disagreement, an argument that supports ju-
dicial review on this basis obviously risks proving too much.  If multi-
ple vetoes are good, why stop with the legislature, the President, and 
the courts?  Why not establish other institutions with veto powers or 
insist on unanimous consent before any legislation can be enacted? 
Any good answer to questions such as these must have two related 
parts.  First, a sensible balance needs to be struck.  Any scheme that 
relies on fallible human beings to identify and enforce moral rights will 
bring hazards with it, including the costs of errors of over- and under-
enforcement.58  Under these circumstances, no sound approach could 
wholly discount the costs of errors in one or the other direction.59  Al-
though most of us think it worse to convict one innocent defendant 
than to let three or five or perhaps nine guilty persons go free, we do 
not structure the criminal process on the assumption that it would be 
better to let thousands escape accountability than to risk ever punish-
ing a single innocent.  
Second, in striving for a reasonable balance, the strategy of assign-
ing vetoes to multiple institutions makes most sense insofar as the re-
cipient institutions possess distinctive perspectives tending to make 
them more sensitive than others to some morally pertinent considera-
tions.60  A reason to give the President a veto power over legislative 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  57  See generally T HOMAS NAGEL, THE LAST WORD (1997); Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity 
and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87 (1996). 
  58  See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THE-
ORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 255–76 (2006) (categorizing pertinent costs). 
  59  But cf. Cross, supra note 4, at 1577–78 (arguing that “even a wildly incompetent court 
would have a constitutional benefit as a backstop to screen out unconstitutional legislation”). 
  60  My argument in this paragraph parallels the argument for federal habeas corpus review of 
state criminal convictions advanced in Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical 
Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).  The authors defend federal 
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action is that the executive and legislative branches will likely have 
different, potentially valuable vantage points from which to assess 
competing interests and values.  Similarly, a reason to give courts a 
veto power is that courts are likely to have a perspective that may 
make them more sensitive than legislatures to some possible rights vio-
lations even if the evidence on whether that perspective is better over-
all may indeed be “inconclusive.”61  Perhaps most obviously, courts 
typically decide cases upon concrete facts, some of which even highly 
competent legislators may not have foreseen.  Furthermore, a distin-
guishing feature of judges’ professional training and mission involves a 
solicitude for rights as they have historically been understood.  Historic 
understandings may of course have been wrong in some, even many, 
instances.62  Nevertheless, judges’ professionally ingrained instincts 
and processes of judgment are likely to differ from those of legislators 
and to be better adapted to reflecting such imperfect wisdom about the 
content of rights as our legal tradition embodies.63  In the context of 
historic understandings of and anxieties about judicial power, courts 
can also be asked and expected to discharge their reviewing functions 
with reasonable restraint. 
This, then, is the core of the strongest case for judicial review in the 
kind of nonpathological society with which both Waldron and I are 
concerned: errors that result in the underenforcement of rights are 
more troubling than errors that result in their overenforcement, and 
judicial review may provide a distinctively valuable hedge against er-
rors of underenforcement. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
review not on the ground that federal courts are more likely than state courts to define constitu-
tional rights correctly, but on the basis that jurisdictional redundancy is especially desirable be-
cause state and federal courts are likely to have different perspectives on how rights ought to be 
defined.  Id. at 1046–54. 
  61  Although “there are a large number of obviously nontotalitarian societies — Great Britain, 
New Zealand, the Netherlands, Sweden, and France, for example — that survive quite nicely 
without” robust, American-style judicial review, those countries tend to be less protective than the 
United States of claimed rights involving “criminal procedure, freedom of the press when it is ir-
responsible, freedom of speech for the truly evil (Nazis, Klansmen, and child pornographers, for 
example), and a strong separation between church and state.”  Frederick Schauer, Judicial Su-
premacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 C AL. L. REV. 1045, 1066 n.100 (2004).  According to 
Schauer, “[i]t may be wrong for the United States to be so divergent, but setting these countries 
out as models suggests a willingness to accept fewer defendant’s rights, free speech rights, free 
press rights, and separation of church and state rights than exist in the United States.”  Id.; see 
also Frank B. Cross, The Relevance of Law in Human Rights Protection, 19 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 87, 92–93 (1999) (concluding on the basis of empirical data that “[j]udicial independence” 
is “significantly associated with greater political freedom, suggesting a prominent role for the law 
and courts in the protection of freedom”).  
  62  See generally Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 
107 C OLUM.  L.  REV.  1482 ( 2007) (skeptically probing arguments that the historic survival of 
common law decision rules attests to their likely wisdom).   
  63  See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 877 (1996) (defending judicial review partly on Burkean grounds).    
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B.  The Limits of the Outcome-Based Case for Judicial Review: 
Contestable Premises and the Burdens of Judgment 
Having now laid out a basis for supporting judicial review, I should 
clarify the limits of my argument.  Taking seriously Waldron’s claim to 
have mounted a persuasive affirmative case against judicial review, I 
have maintained that his argument is insufficient to dislodge reason-
able beliefs that there are good outcome-related reasons to support ju-
dicial review.  But I have meant to hedge my argument with appeals 
to what it would be reasonable to believe, rather than claiming 
straightforwardly to have demonstrated the desirability of judicial re-
view, because my argument depends on a number of unproven as-
sumptions, some of which may be only implicit in what I have said so 
far. 
Although it would mark a great advance if I could now make a 
clinching demonstration of the validity of the assumptions on which 
my argument rests, I fear that I must leave matters of proof more or 
less where they stand.  It is important, however, that I should identify 
the central moral, conceptual, and empirical premises on which an ar-
gument such as mine must ultimately depend. 
First, I have assumed that even if courts cannot be shown to be 
better than legislatures at resolving disputed rights questions, courts 
are likely to have a distinctive perspective, involving both a focus on 
particular facts and a sensitivity to historical understandings of the 
scope of certain rights, that would heighten their sensitivity to some 
actual or reasonably arguable violations that legislatures would fail to 
apprehend.  Although this premise is obviously contestable, even crit-
ics of judicial review do not generally deny that courts have some ad-
vantages in resolving rights claims.  Waldron, for example, argues only 
that the case for thinking courts more likely than legislatures to resolve 
rights disputes correctly is ultimately “inconclusive,” not that it is 
clearly insupportable.64 
Second, I have assumed that legislative action is more likely to vio-
late fundamental rights than is legislative inaction.  This is a com-
monly held assumption that underlies a variety of familiar governmen-
tal structures — such as bicameralism requirements and provisions for 
presidential vetoes — that are designed to stop political majorities 
from enacting their preferences as readily as possible into law.  Indeed, 
Waldron himself speaks favorably of bicameralism as a well-advised 
check against “legislative pathologies”65 (notwithstanding the obvious 
possibility of reasonable disagreement over which popular dispositions 
count as pathological). 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  64  Waldron, The Core Case, supra note 10, at 1375. 
  65  Id. at 1361 & n.47.    
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Nevertheless, the assumption that governmental action is more 
likely to violate rights than governmental inaction is certainly open to 
challenge.  One might contest it on the ground that a well-designed 
constitution would include a substantial number of “positive” rights to 
governmental assistance.66  Or a challenger might maintain that the 
realization of many important moral rights requires affirmative gov-
ernmental action even if the relevant rights are not formally denomi-
nated in a bill of rights.  Moreover, even if positive rights are put to 
one side, a risk certainly exists that judicial review could sometimes 
frustrate legislative efforts to protect fundamental rights, depending on 
how constitutions are first written and then construed.  
Dred Scott v. Sandford,67 in which the Supreme Court ruled that 
Congress could not forbid slavery in the federal territories, offers a 
case in point.  Waldron cites a different example, Lochner v. New 
York,68 in which the Supreme Court invalidated a statute setting 
maximum working hours for bakers.  Although I am uncertain 
whether  Lochner should be regarded as a case in which the courts 
stymied legislative efforts to protect fundamental individual rights, 
rather than simply thwarted the legislature from implementing a hu-
mane policy, the example deserves attention.  In a study of the recent 
introduction of bills of rights and judicial review into Israel, Canada, 
South Africa, and New Zealand, Ran Hirschl concludes that whereas 
those countries’ constitutional courts have “fortif[ied] and expand[ed] 
the boundaries of the private sphere in the context of freedom of ex-
pression and religion, freedom of movement, the right to privacy (in-
cluding reproductive freedom), and formal equality,”69 they have “ut-
terly failed to promote progressive or egalitarian notions of distributive 
justice in a meaningful way.”70  In some instances, Hirschl writes, 
courts enforcing bills of rights have actually “shield[ed] the economic 
sphere from attempts to reduce socioeconomic disparity through regu-
latory and redistributive means.”71 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  66  See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEX. 
L. REV. 1895, 1919 (2004) (describing positive rights recognized in foreign constitutions and argu-
ing that “[t]he experience of constitutional courts around the world suggests that scholars of U.S. 
constitutional law would do well to rethink the conventional wisdom about the inclusion of social 
welfare rights in judicially enforceable constitutions”).  But cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive 
Rights, in WESTERN RIGHTS?: POST-COMMUNIST APPLICATION 225, 225 (András Sajó ed., 
1996) (asserting that it is “a large mistake, possibly a disaster” to include positive rights in consti-
tutions in countries transitioning from communism to a market economy). 
  67  60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
  68  198 U.S. 45 ( 1905);  see Waldron, The Core Case,  supra note 10, at 1348 (making this   
reference). 
  69  RAN  HIRSCHL,  TOWARDS  JURISTOCRACY:  THE  ORIGINS  AND  CONSEQUENCES  OF 
THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 118 (2004).    
  70  Id. at 14. 
  71  Id. at 218.     
1712  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 121:1693  
The lesson that emerges from Dred Scott, Lochner, and Hirschl’s 
study — and, some would say, from recent decisions by the U.S. Su-
preme Court invalidating legislation enacted by Congress under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment72 — is that the question whether 
legislative action is more likely to threaten or protect important indi-
vidual rights has crucial empirical and predictive as well as moral di-
mensions.  Much depends on the status quo, the kinds of injustices 
that it includes, and the likelihood of successful legislative or judicial 
action to correct current moral shortfalls.73 
As presently advised, I believe that those designing and assessing 
constitutions in most western liberal democracies could reasonably as-
sume that legislative action is more likely than inaction to violate fun-
damental rights.74  This judgment obviously underlies bills of rights 
that create negative but not positive rights — and even Hirschl, in ex-
pressing frustration that judicial review has not done much to solve 
problems of distributive inequality, hedges in his assessment of 
whether judicial review has, on balance, done more harm than good.75  
Moreover, because economic regulatory and redistributive legislation 
of the kind involved in Lochner-era cases does not typically threaten 
any fundamental rights at all, it should not be assumed that judicial 
review will result in the invalidation of such legislation (even if the 
possibility cannot be rejected out of hand). 
I take very seriously, however, the possibility that some categories 
of cases should be exempted from judicial review, or at least subjected 
to judicial review of only a very narrow scope.  Among other things, a 
multiple-veto-opportunities argument in favor of judicial review has 
no traction in cases in which legislatures seek to promote the rights of 
one class of citizens without threatening the fundamental rights of an-
other.  Nor does my argument apply in zero-sum controversies in 
which fundamental rights are pitted against one another and the over-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  72  See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (invalidating congressional legisla-
tion expanding rights to freedom from age-based employment discrimination). 
  73  Cf. Freeman, supra note 56, at 361 (noting that “whether judicial review is appropriate for a 
particular democratic constitution is a strategic question”). 
  74  Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 56, at 469 (arguing that 
“the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legisla-
tive encroachments”). 
  75  Hirschl writes, for example, that “[w]hereas the constitutionalization of rights does have 
crucial importance in affirming marginalized identities and enhancing the status of individual 
freedoms, its independent impact on ameliorating the socioeconomic status of historically disen-
franchised groups is often exaggerated.”  HIRSCHL, supra note 69, at 168 (emphasis added).  As 
the italicized language indicates, Hirschl is not always clear about the relationship between his 
claims that judicial review has failed to advance and that it has actually thwarted interests in 
progressive redistribution, and his judgment of the overall balance of the costs and benefits for 
judicial review for disadvantaged groups frequently seems equivocal.    
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enforcement of one entails the underenforcement of the other.  I shall 
more fully discuss the challenge posed by such cases in Part IV. 
 The third, related assumption on which I have relied is that some 
rights are more fundamental than others and, accordingly, deserve 
more protections against infringement through the provision of multi-
ple veto opportunities.  This assumption is also contestable.  It is at 
least arguable — indeed, Waldron himself has maintained in other 
writing — that every claim of individual right asserted against democ-
ratically enacted legislation also implicates the majority’s “right” to 
collective self-government.76  If collective self-governance is a right, 
and if it stands on the same plane of moral importance as such rights 
as freedom of speech and religion, then there could be no sound reason 
to err on the side of overprotecting the rights that bills of rights cus-
tomarily recite. 
As I have suggested, Waldron may in fact believe that the right to 
self-government possesses the same moral status as many of the rights 
commonly listed in bills of rights.  He develops an argument that em-
phasizes the importance of rights of democratic self-government — 
with the term “right” used in a strongly moralized sense — in his im-
portant book Law and Disagreement.77  Interestingly, however, he 
places little if any weight on this argument in The Core of the Case 
Against Judicial Review.  The reason may involve his third assump-
tion: that the societies that come within his core case hold a serious 
commitment to the protection of rights that they have memorialized in 
a bill of rights.78  In most bills of rights, a general right of political ma-
jorities to govern themselves by processes of majority decisionmaking 
does not occupy the same status as fundamental individual rights pro-
tected against legislative infringement. 
In any event, the view that certain core individual rights are more 
morally important than a general right to democratic self-government 
seems to me both widely held and, at the very least, reasonable.  Nev-
ertheless, to defend this view would take a very long argument that I 
shall not attempt here. 
The fourth assumption undergirding my thesis that outcome-based 
arguments support judicial review is that a system of judicial review 
can be so designed that the total moral costs of the overenforcement of 
rights that judicial review would likely produce will be lower than the 
moral costs that would result from the underenforcement of rights that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  76  See WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 10, at 213; see also Roosevelt, su-
pra note 49, at 1662 (explaining that some citizens may support judicial restraint because when a 
court “erroneously strikes down a valid governmental act, the American people . . . have been de-
nied the ability to govern themselves”). 
  77  See WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 10, at 233–54. 
  78  See Waldron, The Core Case, supra note 10, at 1364–66.    
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would likely occur in the absence of judicial review.  This is a very 
large assumption, and I shall revisit it in Part IV, which considers 
more specifically how judicial review ought to be designed, after Part 
III has introduced some further pertinent considerations.  For now, 
suffice it to say that any assumption that judicial review can be so de-
signed that its moral benefits will exceed its costs rests on tricky as-
sessments along at least two dimensions.  It requires predictions about 
comparative numbers of errors and about the comparative moral costs 
of over- and underenforcement under circumstances in which reason-
able disagreement exists both about what would count as over- and 
underenforcement and about what their respective moral costs would 
be.79  In developing my argument, I have advanced no formula for 
making these calculations.80 
My failure to work out responses to challenges to my crucial fourth 
assumption might appear to concede one of Waldron’s main conten-
tions: given the difficulty of producing an analytically rigorous formula 
for determining whether, when, and to what extent judicial review 
might lead to morally better outcomes than would otherwise occur, 
perhaps we should just dismiss outcome-based arguments as ulti-
mately “inconclusive.”  But I think not.  For anyone considering 
whether outcome-related reasons come out for or against judicial re-
view, three possible answers stand out: first, the balance of outcome-
related reasons supports judicial review; second, the balance of out-
come-related reasons opposes judicial review; third, outcome-related 
concerns are sufficiently uncertain that the decision whether to have 
judicial review should be made on other grounds entirely.  What merits 
emphasis is that the third conclusion is as much subject to the risks of 
moral and empirical error as either of the first two.  If outcome-related 
concerns matter in principle in deliberations about whether to support 
or oppose judicial review, the question of comparative moral costs 
needs to be answered, whatever the difficulties in making the requisite 
calculations. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  79  Other considerations also matter, including the “uncertainty costs” that exist when it cannot 
be known in advance whether legislation will ultimately be upheld as valid.  See VERMEULE, 
supra note 58, at 275.  In believing that a multiple-veto-points case for judicial review must de-
pend on a sophisticated, multifactored calculation of costs and benefits, I differ with Frank Cross, 
who maintains that the overenforcement of rights is so categorically preferable to underenforce-
ment that judicial review would be desirable even if courts were “typically wrong and much less 
capable than Congress” in making decisions about when to uphold rights claims.  Cross, supra 
note 4, at 1577–78.  
  80  Cf. WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 10, at 252–53 (noting that instru-
mental arguments for choosing one or another mechanism to adjudicate claims of rights fre-
quently commit the fallacy of “presuppos[ing] our possession of the truth about rights in designing 
an authoritative procedure whose point it is to settle that very issue”).    
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The question of comparative moral costs is not, of course, a binary 
one, for a crucial variable involves the nature or scope of the judicial 
review that courts might practice.  As I have noted, no one would 
think that criminal defendants should go free in every case that occa-
sions even the smallest scintilla of doubt about the defendant’s inno-
cence.  Similarly, no one would think that the rules governing judicial 
invalidation of legislation should mandate the striking down of every 
statute that could even colorably be argued to violate someone’s rights. 
In designing a morally defensible system of judicial review, two in-
terrelated questions thus need to be resolved.  One involves which 
rights and other constitutional norms the judiciary should be enlisted 
to enforce.  A related question is how stringent judicial review ought to 
be in order to get the balance of moral costs and benefits into an opti-
mal or at least a defensible alignment.  For example, should courts ex-
ercise independent judgment in identifying rights violations, should 
they invalidate legislation only in cases of “clear mistake” by the legis-
lature,81 or should they employ standards of review of some intermedi-
ate scope?82  Once again, I have not attempted to work out answers to 
questions such as these, though I shall say a bit more about them in 
Part IV.  Instead, I have assumed that it is reasonable to believe that 
such questions can be resolved satisfactorily, even if not perfectly or 
with unanimous accord. 
Although the assumptions on which my case rests are, I repeat, 
very large — and the case itself thus is somewhat uneasy — I believe 
that any persuasive case for judicial review would need to rely on as-
sumptions that are similarly strong.  Surely this is true of the familiar 
claim that courts are better than legislatures at resolving rights-based 
disputes correctly under conditions of reasonable disagreement. 
To conclude, despite Waldron’s argument to the contrary, it is rea-
sonable to believe that a constitutional democracy with a well-designed 
system of judicial review would produce a morally better pattern of 
outcomes than a political democracy without judicial review, even if 
Waldron’s four conditions hold, under circumstances that plausibly   
exist. 
III.  PROCESS-BASED REASONS AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
Waldron’s core case against judicial review also has a process-
based component,83 and it, too, merits consideration and a response.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  81  See Thayer, supra note 46, at 144; see also VERMEULE, supra note 58, at 270–76 (also de-
fending a version of the clear-mistake rule).    
  82  See Roosevelt, supra note 49, at 1661–63 (arguing that courts may adopt decision rules of 
varying levels of scrutiny based on assessments of the costs of error and the desire to minimize 
certain kinds of error). 
  83  See Waldron, The Core Case, supra note 10, at 1375, 1386–95.    
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In formal terms, the analysis that I offer in this Part parallels my re-
sponse to Waldron’s outcome-based arguments in Part II: my criti-
cisms of Waldron’s case against judicial review add up to, or at least 
suggest, a qualified argument that actually supports judicial review on 
grounds of fairness and political legitimacy. 
Although this conclusion can be stated simply, my argument in this 
Part is intricate, reflecting the complex interrelationships among con-
cepts or ideals of (1) the morally best pattern of substantive outcomes, 
(2) procedural fairness, and (3) political legitimacy.  A preliminary 
mapping of this Part’s organizational structure may therefore prove 
helpful. 
After briefly recounting Waldron’s process-based argument against 
judicial review, I begin by arguing that the fairness of decisionmaking 
procedures depends heavily on whether they are well designed to 
achieve substantively good outcomes.  Waldron treats issues of fairness 
and legitimacy as independent of any outcome-based considerations 
that might support judicial review — for he, of course, believes that 
none exists.  But if judicial review reduces rights violations, this bene-
fit is clearly relevant to the issue of fairness, and it ought to matter to 
legitimacy as well. 
Legitimacy, however, is a less intuitive concept than is fairness.  In 
order to show that the legitimacy of decision procedures may depend 
partly on their capacity to generate substantively just outcomes, it is 
necessary to unpack the concept of political legitimacy.  In doing so, I 
distinguish between overall political legitimacy, which is the ultimate 
concern of democratic political theory, and specifically democratic le-
gitimacy, which is a vital source of political legitimacy, but not the 
only one.  In light of this distinction, I maintain that judicial review 
could contribute to the overall political legitimacy of a constitutional 
regime insofar as it helps to minimize fundamental rights violations, 
even if it lacks democratic legitimacy. 
It is not enough, however, to say that judicial review might make 
some contribution to overall political legitimacy even if it lacks specifi-
cally democratic legitimacy, for the concern remains that at least some 
degree of democratic legitimacy might be necessary for overall political 
legitimacy.  In other words, the possibility must be confronted that ju-
dicial review might so far deprive a political system of its necessary 
modicum of specifically democratic legitimacy as to render that system 
illegitimate overall.  In the final section of this Part, I consider and 
dismiss arguments to this effect, subject to the proviso that certain as-
sumptions must hold.  
A.  Waldron’s Process-Based Argument — And Its Limits 
Waldron’s process-based argument against judicial review rests on 
what he characterizes as “the well-known fairness arguments” in favor    
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of “the principle of majority decision.”84  According to him, this is the 
preferred mechanism for resolving disputed issues of governmental 
policy “[w]hen we disagree about the desired outcome, when we do not 
want to bias the matter up-front one way or another, and when each of 
the relevant participants has a moral claim to be treated as an 
equal.”85 
If Waldron were correct that there are no good outcome-related 
reasons to want judicial review, his fairness arguments would carry the 
day.  But if he is wrong about the balance of outcome-based considera-
tions, then his fairness arguments also lose their potency.  It is almost 
too plain for argument that the fairness of procedures depends on the 
nature of the substantive ends that the procedures are designed to pro-
mote.  For example, it is not unfair to use nonmajoritarian voting pro-
cedures in criminal trials; to accord each juror the power to veto a 
guilty verdict is wholly justifiable in view of the goals of the criminal 
justice system.  Similarly, most of us do not think it unfair to put con-
trol of interest rates and the money supply in the hands of an inde-
pendent Federal Reserve Board,86 even though these matters can en-
gender reasonable contestation.  Outcome-based considerations make 
this allocation of power fair within the context of an otherwise largely 
democratic government. 
B.  Political Legitimacy and Its Sources 
As I have written elsewhere, the term “legitimacy” admits of di-
verse usages.87  Appraisals of legitimacy can occur in sociological 
terms, referring to prevailing public attitudes toward political authori-
ties and, in particular, to popular dispositions to respect those authori-
ties’ claims to obedience.88  Alternatively, legitimacy can function as a 
moral concept, measuring whether people ought to regard a political 
regime, institution, or decision as having an entitlement to respect that 
transcends the substantive correctness of an immediate object of dis-
pute.89  In The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, Waldron’s 
concern involves moral legitimacy.90 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  84  Id. at 1387–88. 
  85  Id. at 1388. 
  86  But see Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and 
Complexities of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1779 (2003) (noting that central banks 
such as the Federal Reserve “have been widely criticized for lack of democratic legitimacy”).  
  87  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution,  118 H ARV.  L.  REV.  1787,  
1789–90 (2005).   
  88  See id. at 1795–96. 
  89  See id. at 1796–1801. 
  90  See Waldron, The Core Case, supra note 10, at 1387–89 (introducing the concept of political 
legitimacy as necessary to explain to those who disagree with political decisions why they none-
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No less than fairness, political legitimacy is relative to the ends that 
an institution seeks to achieve.  One possible ground for the political 
legitimacy of a decision is that it emerged from open processes in 
which all citizens had equal voice and votes.91  But there are grounds 
for political legitimacy besides the majority-decision principle.  An-
other good reason to respect a decision and to regard it as deserving 
obedience is that it issued from a process designed to reach generally 
sensible substantive decisions while making infringements of individ-
ual rights as unlikely as reasonably possible.92 
When the diversity of potential sources of political legitimacy 
comes into view, what Waldron can claim to have established convinc-
ingly is, at most, that judicial review lacks the specifically democratic 
form of legitimacy that adheres to decisions reached through majori-
tarian processes.  When other sources of political legitimacy enter the 
calculus, the possibility emerges that judicial review might actually 
promote, not detract from, the overall legitimacy of a governmental 
regime if it provides important assurances against rights violations. 
C.  Comparative Democratic and Political Legitimacy 
In claiming that judicial review might enhance the legitimacy of a 
system of government, I need to introduce some qualifications.  Al-
though there are multiple possible sources of political legitimacy, de-
mocratic legitimacy matters deeply.  A scheme of government that 
wholly lacked democratic legitimacy, such as a hereditary dictatorship, 
might strike us not only as seriously deficient in democratic legitimacy, 
but also as lacking political legitimacy more generally.  This judgment 
might well persist even if the dictator put a number of safeguards in 
place to protect against violations of the individual rights that typically 
appear in bills of rights — except, of course, for voting and political 
rights.  It is therefore necessary to take seriously whether judicial re-
view sufficiently robs an otherwise generally democratic scheme of 
government of its democratic legitimacy that it threatens the system’s 
political legitimacy overall. 
 1 .  Anchoring Assumptions. — Although the question whether judi-
cial review might diminish or even demolish overall political legiti-
macy bears asking, it is also nebulous.  No set scale for calibrating po-
litical legitimacy exists, and the standards of assessment can be at best 
loosely defined.  I shall proceed, however, on the basis of a number of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
theless ought to regard those decisions as worthy of respect and as having a moral claim to   
obedience). 
  91  See id. at 1387–88. 
  92  Cf. Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 145 (2003) (as-
serting that “a legitimate lawmaking process is one that provides adequate assurances that the 
laws it validates are just”).    
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assumptions, beginning with three conceptual assumptions that I mean 
to be neutral with respect to the legitimacy of judicial review.  First, as 
I have signaled already, I assume that the purpose of legitimacy inquir-
ies is to determine whether citizens have a moral reason to accede to 
political decisions with which they substantively disagree93 or whether 
government officials are morally justified in coercively enforcing the 
law.94  Second, I assume that in every case this question has either a 
yes or a no answer — that is, that it is either minimally legitimate or is 
not (even if there is reasonable disagreement about which answer is 
correct).  Third, however, I assume that among minimally legitimate 
regimes some are more legitimate, in the sense of more closely ap-
proximating an ideal of perfect legitimacy, than are others.95  Accord-
ingly, judicial review might affect political legitimacy in either of two 
ways: it might make a political regime either legitimate or illegitimate 
in the minimal sense, or it might affect whether a minimally legitimate 
scheme of government is more or less legitimate. 
Even with these anchors in place, inquiry into the legitimacy of ju-
dicial review risks cascading into self-defeating abstraction.  To meet 
this difficulty, I shall make four additional, substantive assumptions 
about the political regimes to which judicial review might be added or 
from which it might be subtracted.  Although these assumptions are 
deliberately chosen to make the case for the legitimacy of judicial re-
view seem plausible, none of them, to borrow a term from Waldron, is 
“unrealistic.”  Moreover, all reflect the modest aspirations of this Arti-
cle, which aims not to prove decisively that every society should adopt 
judicial review, but only to show that there are plausibly imaginable 
yet nonpathological circumstances under which judicial review would 
contribute to political legitimacy overall. 
First, I shall assume that a system with judicial review produces 
fewer violations of fundamental rights than would a system without 
judicial review. 
Second, I shall assume that a system that includes judicial review 
also comprises reasonably well-functioning democratic institutions, 
such as a legislature, with large responsibilities for the enactment of 
law and the design of governmental policy. 
Third, I shall assume that the decision to establish judicial review 
emerged from a majoritarian or supermajoritarian process at Time 
One, even though it subsequently constrains majority decisionmaking 
at Time Two and thereafter. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  93  See Waldron, The Core Case, supra note 10, at 1386–87. 
  94  See Fallon, supra note 87, at 1800. 
  95  Id. at 1796–99 (distinguishing “ideal” from “minimal” legitimacy).     
1720  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 121:1693  
Fourth, I shall assume that the citizens living at Time Two, or at 
least many of them, feel a psychological sense of connection to their 
Time One predecessors as co-participants in an enterprise of collective 
self-government extended over time. 
2.  Transitional Questions. — Although all of my anchoring as-
sumptions are important, the third substantive assumption most di-
rectly frames the questions raised by Waldron’s arguments: is it politi-
cally legitimate for democratic majorities or supermajorities at Time 
One to establish judicial review as one element of a multi-part system 
of government, notwithstanding actual or anticipated protests that ju-
dicial review is unfair because it will make it more difficult for politi-
cal majorities to enact their preferences into law at Time Two?  This 
question has many possible variants, of which I shall consider just 
two.  First, I shall discuss the political and especially the democratic 
legitimacy of judicial review when judicial review is not entrenched in 
a society’s constitution.  Absent entrenchment, judicial review exists, 
but it could be abolished by majority vote in the legislature, which 
could also override any particular judicial decision.  Second, I shall 
consider the distinct issues that arise when judicial review is en-
trenched in a double sense — when the rights protected by judicial re-
view cannot be altered or abolished except by supermajoritarian pro-
cedures, and when the institution of judicial review is itself protected 
against abolition by mere legislative majorities. 
3.  Judicial Review Without Entrenchment. — If a majority of citi-
zens in an otherwise reasonably democratic society wants to establish 
or maintain nonentrenched judicial review as a means of protecting 
nonentrenched rights, I can see no plausible objection of political le-
gitimacy.  As I have argued, judicial review might reasonably be 
thought to enhance substantive justice by minimizing infringements of 
important rights.  Moreover, when judicial review is not entrenched 
and when it protects rights that are also not entrenched, judicial re-
view does not so much derogate from the principle of majority decision 
as implement it: democratic majorities that want judicial review for 
outcome-based reasons are entitled to legislate accordingly. 
I am not sure whether Waldron agrees with this assessment.  In 
The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, he states at the outset 
that the target of his argument is strong or entrenched, not weak or 
nonentrenched, judicial review.96  Later, however, he advances an ar-
gument, almost in passing, that appears to assert the unfairness of ju-
dicial review that is subject to legislative override.  Even if the legisla-
ture can amend the provisions on which courts have based their 
decisions to invalidate legislation, it is unfair, he writes, to have a sys-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  96  See Waldron, The Core Case, supra note 10, at 1354.    
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tem of judicial review that “will have credentials in the political cul-
ture that raise the stakes and increase the burden associated with the 
amendment effort” and thereby result in “the deck . . . be[ing] stacked” 
against those who dislike what a court has done.97 
Although Waldron’s passing remark should raise a red flag for 
anyone otherwise prepared to assume without analysis that nonen-
trenched judicial review is wholly immune to fairness objections, it is 
not easy to identify the premises on which an argument to the contrary 
might rest.  On the strongest possible interpretation, the majority-
decision principle would condemn any rule that impedes current ma-
jorities from enacting their preferences as frictionlessly as possible into 
law.  Although this extreme interpretation would explain a belief that 
even nonentrenched judicial review is politically illegitimate, the posi-
tion that it reflects seems chimerical.98  Because democratic govern-
ment cannot exist in the absence of rules to constitute it, decisionmak-
ers at Time One need to be able to structure or constitute the forms of 
political democracy — the voting rules, the offices for which elections 
will be held, the requirements for the enactment of valid legislation, 
and so forth — that will obtain thereafter unless they are authorita-
tively changed.99  Moreover, virtually every electoral mechanism and 
rule of parliamentary procedure may have some effect in frustrating 
the wishes of current majorities.  Why are elections so far apart?  Why 
must so many rules and procedures — requirements of multiple read-
ings, opportunities to prolong debate, and so forth — stand in the way 
of enacting a bill into law?  Whether they are wise or unwise, many 
rules established at Time One do not so much constrain political de-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  97  Id. at 1394.  The pertinent passage reads as follows: 
[D]efenders of judicial review claim that if legislators disagree with a judicial decision 
about rights, they can campaign to amend the Bill of Rights to explicitly override it.  
Their failure to do this amounts to a tacit democratic endorsement.  This argument is 
flawed because it does not defend the baseline that judicial decisionmaking establishes.  
Amending a Bill of Rights characteristically involves a supermajority; or if it is a Brit-
ish- or New Zealand-style statute [that can be overruled by a simple legislative major-
ity], it will have credentials in the political culture that raise the stakes and increase the 
burden associated with the amendment effort.  If our disgruntled citizen Cn asks why 
the deck should be stacked in this way, the only answer we can give her refers back to 
judicial decision.  And that has already been found wanting. 
Id. 
  98  See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE 
L.J. 1665, 1686 (2002) (noting that “[t]he Condorcet paradox . . . casts doubt on the premise that a 
simple majority can in normal circumstances even be identified,” due to the phenomenon of cy-
cling, in the absence of institutional structures and mechanisms of agenda control). 
  99  In theory, at least, there is a major puzzle about how an initiating institution such as a con-
stitutional convention could organize itself without a prior settlement of voting rules.  See JON 
ELSTER, ULYSSES AND  THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 95 
(rev. ed. 1984) (hypothesizing that in the case of an “original assembly” the “circumstances [may] 
make for a unity and unanimity in the face of which procedural questions evaporate”).      
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mocracy as establish and empower it100 — even though the effect of 
some is to “raise the stakes and increase the burden” that must be 
borne by those wanting change. 
Beyond concerns about simple coherence, ideals of democratic le-
gitimacy need to be tested against and brought into a sensible align-
ment with broader ideals of political legitimacy, which presumably at-
tach significance to the likelihood that structures of (reasonably) 
democratic government will produce good substantive outcomes — so 
that bicameralism can be preferred over unicameralism, for example, 
not because it is more democratic, but because it is likely to yield bet-
ter legislation.  To put the point slightly differently, there may be com-
peting conceptions of democratic legitimacy.101  Given a choice, one 
might reasonably prefer a conception that coheres as well as possible 
with the best ideal of overall political legitimacy, including the con-
cerns about substantively good government that the broader ideal   
imports. 
On this point, Waldron would not appear to disagree with my 
analysis, at least in the abstract.  For example, he not only assumes 
that bicameralism requirements accord with democratic ideals, but ac-
tually supports bicameralism on the ground that it furnishes a prudent 
check against possible majoritarian pathologies.102  He gives no hint, 
moreover, that he would withdraw his praise in cases — such as that 
of the Constitution of the United States — in which exacting require-
ments for the enactment of legislation were put into place for the pur-
pose of stopping transient majorities from violating individual rights, 
notwithstanding reasonable disagreement about those rights’ proper 
contours. 
Measured against premises that Waldron clearly accepts, the argu-
ment that nonentrenched judicial review would be politically or even 
democratically illegitimate thus seems unpersuasive.  The same con-
clusion emerges from reflection on the untenable implications of the 
premise that it is democratically illegitimate for political majorities to 
establish institutions “that will have credentials in the political culture 
that raise the stakes and increase the burden” of reversing their deci-
sions by majority vote in the legislature.103  This premise would sug-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  100  See STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT 134–77 (1995); Larry Alexander, 
What Is the Problem of Judicial Review?, 31 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 1, 3–4 (2006). 
  101  See, e.g., John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 TEX. L. 
REV. 1929, 1933 (2003) (noting that “[d]emocracy is an essentially contested concept”); Freeman, 
supra note 56, at 332–39 (criticizing a purely procedural or majoritarian conception of democracy 
and defending an alternative social contractarian conception that also incorporates a demand for 
respect for basic individual rights). 
  102  See Waldron, The Core Case, supra note 10, at 1361 & n.47. 
  103  As Posner and Vermeule argue, much ordinary legislation has the same effect:  
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gest, for example, that it is politically illegitimate for states to vest re-
sponsibility for drawing electoral districts in unelected, nonpartisan 
commissions, the decisions of which could be overturned by a partisan 
majority in the legislature.104  As I have suggested already, reliance on 
a mechanism of this kind could more aptly be described as implement-
ing decisions made by a fairly democratic process than as unfairly 
“stack[ing]” the “deck” against those who appeal to the principle of 
majority rule. 
4.  Entrenched Rights and Judicial Review. — If some constitutive 
rules of democratic government that were enacted at Time One can 
make it difficult for Time Two majorities to enact their preferences 
into law without affronting the ideal of democratic legitimacy, the 
question arises why, or if, entrenchment is different.  If bicameralism 
requirements and presidential vetoes are democratically acceptable de-
vices for protecting individual rights, then what, if anything, is so ob-
jectionable from the perspective of democratic legitimacy about Time 
One decisions to entrench certain rights105 — especially if the en-
trenchments are subject to supermajoritarian override and thus make 
it difficult but not impossible for Time Two majorities to enact their 
preferences into law?106 
(a)  Entrenched Rights Without Judicial Review. — Because en-
trenched rights could exist even in the absence of judicial review, with 
the legislature trusted to define and enforce them, it is an important 
preliminary question in considering Waldron’s argument against judi-
cial review whether he opposes all entrenchments of rights or just en-
trenched rights coupled with entrenched judicial review.  In The Core 
of the Case Against Judicial Review, Waldron elides this question.107  
In Law and Disagreement, however, he suggested that he finds all en-
trenchment to be incompatible with democratic ideals: 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
The Endangered Species Act imposes a political cost on later congressional majorities 
with different views about species protection — majorities who might be willing to al-
low or even promote animal takings and habitat destruction absent the Act but who are 
not willing to pay the price attendant upon repealing the Act to accomplish those   
purposes.  
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 98, at 1696.  
  104  Such commissions have been proposed or established in a number of states to preserve the 
basic fairness of the electoral system.  See generally Scott M. Lesowitz, Recent Development, In-
dependent Redistricting Commissions, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 535 (2006).  
  105  For a lucid introduction to debates about this issue since the eighteenth century, see 
HOLMES, supra note 100.  
  106  It bears noting that entrenchment comes in degrees, reflecting differences in the obstacles 
that would need to be overcome at Time Two in order to displace a norm entrenched at Time 
One.  For discussion, see infra section IV.C. 
  107  Waldron assumes that a society committed to rights will have a bill of rights, though he 
“mak[es] no assumption that the Bill of Rights is entrenched . . . .  I want to leave that open.”  
Waldron, The Core Case, supra note 10, at 1365.    
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    To embody a right in an entrenched constitutional document is to 
adopt a certain attitude towards one’s fellow citizens.  That attitude is 
best summed up as a combination of self-assurance and mistrust: self-
assurance in the proponent’s conviction that what he is putting forward 
really is a matter of fundamental right and that he has captured it ade-
quately in the particular formulation he is propounding; and mistrust, im-
plicit in his view that any alternative conception that might be concocted 
by elected legislators next year or in ten years’ time is so likely to be 
wrong-headed or ill-motivated that his own formulation is to be elevated 
immediately beyond the reach of ordinary legislative revision.108 
Waldron’s argument that entrenchment reflects a kind of insult by 
Time One decisionmakers directed toward their partners and succes-
sors in democratic self-governance moves too quickly.  Not all en-
trenchments of decisions inherently involve insults.  For example, in-
dividual human beings can have good, noninsulting reasons to 
entrench current decisions against future reversal even with respect to 
themselves, as illustrated by the much cited case of Ulysses and the  
Sirens.109 
The argument that entrenchments are inherently insulting also ig-
nores the constitutive function that constitutions sometimes perform.  
At Time One, it may be an open question for those drafting or being 
asked to assent to a constitution whether or with whom to join in a 
proposed project of collective self-government.110  Under these circum-
stances, it may not be unreasonable to seek entrenchment of assur-
ances without which a proposed collective venture would appear unat-
tractive or even unacceptable.  When the question at issue is who 
“one’s fellow citizens” will be, the suggestion that bargaining for en-
trenched guarantees reflects an unworthy “combination of self-
assurance and mistrust” seems misplaced. 
Any general claim that all entrenchments of rights necessarily vio-
late the minimal requirements of democratic legitimacy seems similarly 
unsustainable.  To begin with, some rights, such as voting and free 
speech rights, might actually be necessary for democratic legitimacy to 
exist.  One source of democratic legitimacy — not the only source, but 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  108  WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 10, at 221–22. 
  109  See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 99, at 36–37.  In citing a case of individual precommitment, I 
do not mean to suggest that the entrenchment of norms in constitutions — in which one genera-
tion attempts to bind successor generations as well as itself — are similar in all or even most re-
spects.  I mean only to argue that attempts at precommitment do not necessarily convey an insult. 
  110  Cf. Ferejohn & Sager, supra note 101, at 1930 (noting the likelihood that “those who ex-
pected to be threatened by the new national government” created by the Constitution of the 
United States “insisted that certain of their rights were guaranteed, or committed to, as a price for 
accepting the new government”).      
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an important one — is substantive consonance with democratic   
ideals.111 
In addition, rules adopted at Time One that make it difficult for 
political majorities to enact their preferences into law at Time Two 
may possess at least some democratic legitimacy insofar as they were 
themselves established through democratic processes at Time One and 
insofar as the citizens at Time Two regard their Time One predecessors 
as participants in a continuing regime of collective self-government.112  
On the scale of democratic political legitimacy, it counts for something 
(though surely not for everything) that a rule that frustrates majori-
tarian decisionmaking at Time Two was itself enacted through a fair 
democratic process at Time One. 
Finally, it matters crucially that democratic legitimacy is a property 
of political regimes overall, not just of their components.113  Even if 
one element, such as judicial review, is relatively lacking in democratic 
legitimacy, democratic legitimacy may remain a property of the regime 
as a whole — which, as I have insisted repeatedly now, may gain in 
political legitimacy overall by foregoing aspirations to maximize spe-
cifically democratic legitimacy in some of its elements.  In a country in 
which robustly democratic institutions make the bulk of important po-
litical decisions, the right question about entrenchments of rights is not 
whether they are maximally democratic, but whether they are other-
wise justified within a politically legitimate regime that derives some 
of its legitimacy from specifically democratic sources. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  111  See R ONALD  DWORKIN,  FREEDOM’S  LAW  15–34 ( 1996); Michael J. Klarman, Majori-
tarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 499–501 (1997). 
  112  My way of putting this point may appear to conflate an empirical psychological issue — 
involving how people living at Time Two view their Time One predecessors — with a fundamen-
tally moral issue of political legitimacy.  But I do not think so.  The very idea of democratic le-
gitimacy necessarily presupposes the existence of a community whose practices should at least 
presumptively be democratic.  In considering the specifically democratic legitimacy of any claim 
that a rule is binding in the present because it was adopted by a majoritarian or similar procedure 
in the past, it always matters how those living in the present reasonably understand their connec-
tion with past actors.  Most of us do not doubt the democratic legitimacy of legislation enacted by 
Congress in 1789 or 1889, even though none of us was alive then, any more than we doubt the 
democratic legitimacy of legislation enacted by Congress in 1989 or 2006.  But cf. Thurgood Mar-
shall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–5 
(1987) (questioning “the wisdom, foresight, and sense of justice” of the Framers due to their dis-
crimination on the basis of race and gender).  By contrast, any suggestion that we were bound 
today by a decision reached by majority vote of the British Parliament, whether before or after 
the Revolution, would be wholly lacking in democratic legitimacy in the United States because 
the requisite sense of participation in a shared, ongoing project of democratic self-government 
would be absent. 
  113  See Frank I. Michelman, Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?, 8 REV. CONST. 
STUD. 101, 105 (2003) (maintaining that legitimacy judgments appraise “an entire system, or prac-
tice, or ‘regime’ of government”).       
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(b)  Entrenched Rights Coupled with Entrenched Judicial Review. 
— The strongest objection to judicial review undoubtedly involves en-
trenched constitutional provisions, especially those guaranteeing indi-
vidual rights, that are backed by entrenched judicial review.  Waldron 
argues forcefully that because the appropriate specification of rights 
may be subject to reasonable disagreement, fairness requires the reso-
lution of disagreement by democratically accountable institutions.114 
The first thing to be said about this claim — even insofar as it ap-
peals to the ideal of specifically democratic legitimacy — is that it 
seems at the very least to sweep too broadly.  As John Hart Ely ar-
gued, one vital function of entrenched judicial review can be to pro-
mote democratic legitimacy by ensuring that elected representatives 
adhere to democratic norms.115  Certainly officeholders can have in-
centives to enact measures tending to disable political opposition.   
With this hazard in view, the entrenchment of judicial review to pro-
tect the constitutive norms of political democracy could serve as a 
safeguard of, rather than a threat to, the democratic legitimacy of con-
stitutional government. 
In conjuring the prospect that a legislature might trample on rights 
of political participation or otherwise subvert democratic self-
government, I have of course imagined that two of the four assump-
tions on which Waldron rests his case against judicial review might 
cease to hold: a legislature that disregarded citizens’ rights and con-
cerns of democratic legitimacy would not be “in reasonably good work-
ing order,” nor would it manifest a commitment to preserving rights.  
Accordingly, this might look like the kind of “pathological” situation in 
which Waldron acknowledges that judicial review might indeed be 
warranted.116  Moreover, because the case would come under Wal-
dron’s express exception for pathological societies, it might appear not 
to weaken his argument that entrenched judicial review should be re-
jected as democratically illegitimate in societies whose legislatures are 
in good order. 
But this line of reasoning ignores the distinction between Time 
One, when a constitution is established, and Time Two, when the con-
ditions existing at Time One may have ceased to exist.  Once this dis-
tinction is recognized, it seems plain that decisionmakers at Time One 
might reasonably entrench judicial review of legislation alleged to 
threaten the constitutive norms of political democracy, not because 
they believe their society to be pathological at Time One, but to estab-
lish a bulwark against pathologies that might develop in the future.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  114  See Waldron, The Core Case, supra note 10, at 1389–93. 
  115  See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
135–79 (1980); see generally Klarman, supra note 111. 
  116  Waldron, The Core Case, supra note 10, at 1352, 1401–06.    
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Surely a society can take precautions against the possibility of future 
legislative pathologies without thereby betraying itself as pathological 
already.117 
Of course, judicial review under most constitutions aims to protect 
individual rights on a broad basis, not just to safeguard the constitu-
tive norms of political democracy.  Insofar as entrenched judicial re-
view extends to asserted violations of rights not directly linked to po-
litical democracy, its claim to specifically democratic legitimacy grows 
weaker.  But a slippage into overall political illegitimacy need not   
result. 
Even in cases that trigger reasonable disagreement, the force of 
Waldron’s argument erodes under the weight of a number of mutually 
reinforcing considerations, most if not all of which should now be evi-
dent.  First, as I have emphasized, political legitimacy has sources be-
sides democratic legitimacy.  If good reasons exist to think that en-
trenched judicial review may produce a morally better pattern of 
results than would otherwise occur, then entrenched judicial review 
derives (some) political legitimacy from its functionality.  
Second, the adoption of judicial review through relatively democ-
ratic processes at Time One may endow it with a continuing residue of 
democratic legitimacy at Time Two, even in cases involving reasonable 
disagreement about the appropriate specification of disputed rights.   
Recognizing once more that legitimacy is a matter of degree, I do not 
mean to claim that the entrenchment of judicial review is necessarily 
perfectly democratically legitimate at Time Two, just that democratic 
adoption at Time One may count for something.118 
Finally, insofar as the issue is the democratic legitimacy of the po-
litical system as a whole, rather than just the corner involving judicial 
review, a scheme of government that includes judicial review can still 
register decently high even on the scale of democratic legitimacy.  In 
assessing overall democratic legitimacy, it will matter greatly if a po-
litical regime’s legislature is “in reasonably good working order” and if, 
as I have suggested, many exercises of entrenched judicial review may 
serve more to protect than to threaten political legitimacy. 
When all of these considerations enter the analysis, Waldron fails to 
demonstrate the political illegitimacy of judicial review even in cases 
involving controversial applications of vague moral rights.  If judicial 
review makes a contribution to the overall moral quality of a society’s 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  117  Waldron himself so acknowledges when he defends a preference for bicameral over unicam-
eral legislatures on the ground that “unicameral arrangements can easily exacerbate other legisla-
tive pathologies.”  Id. at 1361 n.47. 
  118  The degree of entrenchment may also matter.  Democratically established entrenchments 
that are subject to displacement by supermajority voting requirements may be less troublesome 
than are absolute or more nearly absolute entrenchments.    
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political decisions, then judicial review might actually enhance the 
overall political legitimacy of an otherwise reasonably democratic con-
stitutional regime. 
IV.  NOTES ON THE DESIGN OF A SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
In advancing a case for judicial review that rests on the desirability 
of multiple veto points to protect fundamental rights, even on the as-
sumption that a well-functioning legislature takes rights seriously, I 
have so far simply assumed that a system of judicial review could be 
so designed that the moral costs of the resulting likely overenforcement 
of rights would be less than the moral costs of the underenforcement of 
rights that could be anticipated otherwise.  For reasons stated above, 
proof of the validity of this assumption exceeds my ambitions in this 
Article.  Nevertheless, the questions whether there should be judicial 
review and how judicial review ought to be designed are too inter-
twined for any complete separation between them to be wholly satis-
factory.  Before concluding, I therefore want to say a few words about 
how my argument in favor of judicial review — which makes no as-
sumption that courts are better than legislatures at resolving questions 
of rights correctly — bears on how judicial review should be designed 
and administered.  For purposes of exposition, I shall separately ad-
dress three issues that are in fact pervasively interconnected.  First, 
which claims of rights should courts review?  Are there some issues 
with respect to which judicial review is unnecessary or unwise?  Sec-
ond, what should be the scope of judicial review, or how searching 
should it be?  Third, should judicial review be entrenched against leg-
islative override (“strong”) or subject to legislative displacement 
(“weak”)? 
A.  Judicially Reviewable Issues 
Because I have rested my argument for judicial review of legisla-
tion on the premise that some rights are more fundamental than others 
and therefore more deserving of protection, my core case extends only 
to the kinds of fundamental rights characteristically protected in bills 
of rights and does not necessarily apply directly to “ordinary” liberty 
rights to freedom from governmental regulation.119  Claims of rights to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  119  Although I have accepted for purposes of argument that courts are no better than legisla-
tures at identifying rights correctly, I have not similarly assumed that courts have no comparative 
advantages over executive officials.  Executive officials must frequently make snap, nondelibera-
tive decisions that even they themselves might not endorse after thinking through the implications 
for individual rights.  Judicial review of executive action thus seems to me a sound practice that 
my argument in no way calls into question, regardless of the nature of the rights at stake.  Cf. 
TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 163–64 (arguing that a system without judicial review of legislative 
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liberty in many Lochner-era cases thus might be excluded entirely 
from judicial review under my argument.  Alternatively, to anticipate a 
“scope of review” issue, judicial scrutiny might be minimal in such 
cases — a possibility that of course tracks current constitutional prac-
tice in the United States.120  Or courts’ decisions in cases of this kind 
might be subject only to weak judicial review even if strong judicial 
review occurred in other cases. 
Similarly, my argument for judicial review does not encompass 
cases in which the legislature enacts its interpretation of fundamental 
rights into law and the resulting legislation does not threaten the fun-
damental rights of others.121  To take an example from U.S. constitu-
tional law, my argument for multiple veto opportunities to protect 
fundamental rights would ordinarily provide no foundation for judicial 
review of congressional action to protect congressionally defined rights 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.122  If no fundamental 
rights are threatened, then my argument would not apply.  Nor would 
my argument establish the desirability of judicial review to protect any 
structural constitutional norms not directly safeguarding fundamental 
rights (including norms of constitutional federalism).123  T h e r e  i s ,  I  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
action should have “a reasonably robust law of ultra vires . . . that denies any legal effect to acts 
by a government official outside the bounds of authority granted the official by the law”).  
  120  See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (explaining that “[i]n areas 
of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines 
nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge 
if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the clas-
sification”); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court 1996 Term—Foreword: Implement-
ing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 69 (1997) (describing how the “rational basis” test and 
other “[n]onsuspect-content tests call for judicial scrutiny pursuant to standards reflecting strong 
presumptions of constitutional validity”). 
  121  Cf. Cross, supra note 4, at 1589 (arguing for a “one-way ratchet” whereby “whichever na-
tional institution provides the greatest protection of rights prevails”). 
  122  The Supreme Court has recently engaged in close oversight of congressional efforts to “en-
force” the Fourteenth Amendment based on its judgment that Congress may not define the Con-
stitution’s substantive guarantees more broadly than the Court has defined them.  See City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (holding that by attempting to provide more protection 
to free exercise rights than had the Supreme Court, Congress exceeded its Section 5 powers, since 
“[l]egislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing 
the Clause”).  The Court once took a more relaxed approach, positing that Congress’s powers un-
der Section 5 mirrored the broad reach of its powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause as 
articulated in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 
384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (holding that “the McCulloch v. Maryland standard is the measure of 
what constitutes ‘appropriate legislation’ under §  5,” which is “a positive grant of legislative 
power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation 
is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
  123  Cf. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 
(1980) (arguing that judicial review is appropriate in cases involving individual rights, but not in 
those involving federalism issues or the respective powers of Congress and the President).  It is 
frequently argued that judicial review of separation-of-powers and federalism issues is appropri-
ate because the ultimate purpose of the separation of powers and federalism is to protect rights.  
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should hasten to add, nothing in my argument that precludes judicial 
review to enforce structural constitutional norms, but the case for judi-
cial review in such cases would need to depend on other arguments 
than those that I have advanced. 
A potentially even larger implication of supporting judicial review 
based on my argument, rather than on the alternative premise that 
courts are better than legislatures at identifying fundamental rights 
correctly, would come in cases in which claims of fundamental rights 
are plausibly (even if not correctly) asserted on both sides.  For exam-
ple, Congress might think certain “accommodations” of religious insti-
tutions or believers necessary to protect their fundamental right to re-
ligious freedom, whereas those burdened by an “accommodation” 
might contend that it violates their fundamental right not to be com-
pelled to support religious practice or belief.124  Or a legislature might 
conclude that prohibitions against hate speech are necessary to afford 
vulnerable minority groups the equal protection of the laws, while op-
ponents claim that a prohibition against hate speech interferes with the 
fundamental right to freedom of expression.125  In cases in which the 
legislature has striven conscientiously to determine which of two com-
peting fundamental rights claims deserves to prevail, my argument — 
which presupposes that legislatures are as likely as courts to decide 
correctly — implies that there is no good reason to want judicial re-
view.  The argument for preferring overenforcement to underenforce-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449–53 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (dis-
puting the notion that separation-of-powers infringements do “not threaten the liberties of indi-
vidual citizens”); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism,  96 Y ALE  L.J.  1425,  1426 
(1987) (arguing that federalism “is designed to protect, not defeat .  .  . individual rights”).  But 
while judicial review of federalism and separation of powers questions plausibly helps to protect 
liberty in a general sense, such review is generally unnecessary to protect fundamental rights, and 
my multiple-veto-opportunities argument rests on the premise that fundamental rights have a 
claim to special judicial protection that other liberty interests do not under conditions of reason-
able disagreement.  
  124  Cf. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding a federal law exempting religious organizations from an 
otherwise applicable prohibition against employment discrimination on the basis of religion even 
though the effect of this exemption was to allow employees to be dismissed based on their reli-
gious practices and beliefs). 
  125  Cf. R.A.V . v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (striking down a city ordinance pro-
hibiting bias-motivated crime because “[t]he First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose 
special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects”); Am. Booksell-
ers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 1985) (declaring unconstitutional on free ex-
pression grounds a city’s antipornography ordinance even while accepting the ordinance’s premise 
that pornography that subordinates women “leads to affront and lower pay at work, insult and 
injury at home, [and] battery and rape on the streets”); Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of De-
mocracy in American Constitutional Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. 
L.  REV. 291, 307–09 (1989) (noting Hudnut’s refusal to balance the interest in free expression 
against the “women’s claims to liberty and equal protection” infringed by unregulated   
pornography).    
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ment of rights has no bite in genuinely zero-sum contests between 
competing claims of fundamental rights.126 
Obviously, however, it may often be disputable whether a particu-
lar case does in fact involve a collision of rights or whether it would be 
reasonable to believe that a collision exists.  It is far from obvious 
what the institutional mechanism for resolving such questions ought to 
be.  One possible approach would have courts decide such issues at the 
threshold of every case and then decline further review if a collision 
between fundamental rights exists or could reasonably be thought to 
exist.  Another approach would assume that actual collisions of fun-
damental rights are likely to occur so rarely, and that the task of dis-
tinguishing actual from purported collisions of fundamental rights is 
likely to be so conceptually complex and politically divisive, that 
courts should simply proceed to decide all cases involving claims of 
fundamental rights, even if it would be desirable in principle to with-
hold review in zero-sum cases.  Division and resentment would seem 
inevitable if a court had to hinge its decision of a disputed question on 
the ground that the contentions of one side were not only mistaken, 
but also unreasonable.  And an approach under which courts exercised 
judicial review in all disputed cases, even though the rationale for their 
doing so would not in principle apply universally, would accord with 
one of the assumptions on which I have said that my multiple-veto-
opportunities defense of judicial review rests — that legislative action 
is more likely to violate fundamental rights than legislative inaction.  
Other possibilities are also imaginable. 
Although my argument for judicial review does not directly man-
date any single approach to cases involving claimed tensions between 
fundamental rights, my tentative judgment is that it would be best to 
have courts determine at the threshold whether a case could reasona-
bly be thought to involve an actual collision of fundamental rights 
and, if so, either go no further or certify any decision on the merits as 
subject to legislative override.  As I have said, when rights disputes 
could reasonably be thought to be zero-sum games, the best argument 
for judicial review runs out if legislatures are presumed to be as likely 
as courts to identify rights correctly. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  126  See Cross, supra note 4, at 1604–05 (arguing that a “multiple vetoes” rationale for judicial 
review identifies no comparative judicial advantage in cases involving conflicts of rights and that 
“difficult tradeoffs are best made by more majoritarian institutions”).  A multiple vetoes argument 
also fails to support judicial review in any case in which there is reasonable disagreement con-
cerning whether a single governmental action either violates an individual’s fundamental rights 
or, to the contrary, is necessary to respect the fundamental rights of that very same person.  This 
situation would exist if, for example, it was reasonable to believe that a partly race-based scheme 
of public school assignments was necessary to enforce a particular schoolchild’s fundamental right 
to an education untainted by past public racism and that race-based assignments would violate 
the same child’s fundamental right not to be stigmatized through treatment as a racial token.    
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B.  Scope of Review 
In cases that could not reasonably be thought to involve zero-sum 
collisions of fundamental rights, every increment in the stringency of 
judicial scrutiny diminishes the risk that a constitutional right will be 
erroneously underenforced, but increases the likelihood of erroneous 
overenforcement.  With the anticipated moral costs of these effects 
needing to be weighed against one another, there is no reason to as-
sume that the same balance should prevail with respect to every fun-
damental right — any more under my rationale for judicial review 
than under a scheme of judicial review predicated on the assumption 
that courts possess a special competence for identifying rights correctly.  
In American constitutional law, for example, different fundamental 
rights are currently protected by a diverse array of tests.127  My pro-
posed multiple-veto-opportunities rationale would easily support a 
similar diversity.  It would also comport with the current judicial prac-
tice of propounding doctrinal tests that implement vague constitutional 
norms without necessarily reflecting their semantic meaning.128  T o  
take perhaps the easiest, best known example, the Miranda129 rule 
calling for the exclusion of confessions from criminal trials unless sus-
pects in police custody have received specified warnings does not pre-
cisely reflect the meaning of a constitutional norm forbidding coerced 
confessions.  Rather, it implements that norm by establishing rules that 
are readily administrable by police and judges alike.130 
My framing of the stakes in weighing the costs of anticipated over- 
and underenforcement of fundamental rights does, however, put scope-
of-review questions in a different light than do familiar discussions of 
how to trade off rights against competing governmental interests.  In 
designing a system of judicial review, the question — as I have empha-
sized — is not solely one of how to weigh rights against other interests 
based on the supposition that we actually know what rights people 
have.  Rather, the challenge is to determine the ultimate standard that 
a court should apply in determining whether to invalidate legislation 
when no initial baseline agreement concerning the content of rights ex-
ists and there is no reason to think courts better than legislatures at re-
solving disputed questions correctly.  One question is how a court, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  127  See Fallon, supra note 120, at 67–73 (providing a typology of “relatively common kinds of 
tests” adopted by the Court “to help define constitutional limits on governmental powers”). 
  128  See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 37–44 
(2001) (developing the thesis that many constitutional tests are judicially constructed devices for 
implementing constitutional norms, not reflecting their original or semantic meanings); Berman, 
supra note 56.  
  129  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
  130  See Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, supra note 56, at 
1305–06.    
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thinking independently, should determine how to define a fundamental 
right.  Another closely related but separate question is whether a court 
should invalidate legislation whenever, in its independent judgment, a 
fundamental right has been violated or whether — under circum-
stances of reasonable disagreement — it should accord more or less 
deference to the legislature’s determination.  For a system-designer, the 
ultimate question has to be how to weigh the risks and costs of under-
enforcement against those of overenforcement when a court and the 
legislature, acting in presumptive good faith, reasonably disagree 
about whether a fundamental right has been violated. 
Relatively deferential review is undoubtedly an option.  Indeed, 
such review is probably a more attractive option when judicial review 
is predicated on the assumption that fundamental rights should be pro-
tected by multiple veto opportunities than if courts are thought more 
likely than legislatures to resolve disputed questions correctly. 
C.  Choosing Strong or Weak Judicial Review 
A final, crucial design question is whether judicial review should be 
strong or weak.  As should already be evident, however, strong and 
weak judicial review are not binary alternatives, but labels that mark 
areas along a spectrum; rights may be more or less entrenched, as may 
the guarantee of judicial review as a mechanism to enforce fundamen-
tal rights.131  The Constitution of the United States, for example, in-
cludes several varieties of entrenchment rules.  Under Article V, the 
amendment of most constitutional rules requires approval by two-
thirds majorities in both houses of Congress and by legislatures or 
conventions in three-fourths of the states.132  But Article V also pro-
vides even more stringently “that no State, without its Consent, shall 
be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate,” and it once established 
absolutely that no amendment could be enacted barring the slave trade 
before 1808.133 
My multiple-veto-opportunities argument in favor of judicial re-
view implies that judicial decisions defining and enforcing fundamen-
tal rights ought to have some degree of invulnerability to override by 
ordinary legislation.  But it is impossible to give an abstract specifica-
tion of exactly where along the spectrum of possible degrees of en-
trenchment the optimal solution lies.  There are too many interrelated 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  131  The most extreme form of entrenchment would purport to be absolute and to bind in perpe-
tuity.  By contrast, a very weak, if not the weakest, form would forbid displacement of a current 
norm by the ordinary majoritarian requirement of fifty percent of the legislature plus one, but 
permit displacement by a vote of fifty percent plus two. 
  132  U.S. CONST. art. V.  
  133  Id.    
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variables.134  In a genuinely nonpathological society of the kind that 
Waldron imagines, only a mild form of entrenchment would seem to 
me to be desirable.  Under conditions of reasonable disagreement, de-
mocratic institutions should not be too disabled from making periodic 
reassessments of where and how to strike the balance in weighing the 
comparative risks and moral costs of the over- and underenforcement 
of fundamental rights. 
Once again, however, it cannot simply be taken for granted that a 
currently nonpathological society will remain that way, and entrenched 
judicial review may provide a stronger hedge against pathologies that 
might develop in the future.  The desirability of relatively more or less 
entrenched judicial review may thus depend on the pathological pro-
clivities, if any, of particular societies — even when no assumption is 
made that those proclivities are socially or politically dominant at a 
particular time. 
D.  Judicial Review in Societies that Are Not Well Ordered 
Perhaps out of an excess of caution, I want to conclude this Part by 
reminding readers that my arguments with respect to constitutional 
design have all proceeded on the assumption that Waldron’s four con-
ditions are satisfied and, in particular, that the legislature is conscien-
tiously committed to respecting individual rights.  I have not pur-
ported to judge how fully the United States or any other society 
realizes the predicates on which Waldron’s arguments and mine de-
pend.  Nor have I purported to assess how judicial review should be 
structured in societies in which the assumptions that I have followed 
Waldron in making are, to one or another extent, less than wholly   
satisfied. 
I hope, however, that the importance of the subjects that I have not 
addressed will not create the impression that I, following Waldron, 
have not plowed rich ground.  Too often American constitutional theo-
rists have focused their analyses exclusively on how the Supreme 
Court of the United States should interpret the Constitution of the 
United States under current circumstances.  The proper domain of 
constitutional theory is broader.  Certainly it should encompass inquir-
ies into what provisions for judicial review (if any) ought to exist in 
constitutions for all societies whose people and legislatures are seri-
ously committed to respecting rights. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  134  Among other things, the appropriate degree of entrenchment might depend on the scope of 
judicial review of legislative action.  If, for example, courts operated under a scope-of-review for-
mula that permitted them to invalidate legislation only in cases in which they thought that the 
legislature had made a “clear mistake” in finding no infringement of fundamental rights, then a 
stronger degree of entrenchment might be appropriate than if it were assumed that courts would 
exercise wholly independent judgment in identifying rights violations.    
2008]  AN UNEASY CASE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW  1735 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In this Article I have advanced parallel, substantially overlapping 
negative and positive theses.  The negative thesis is that Jeremy Wal-
dron’s provocative arguments in The Core of the Case Against Judicial 
Review do not succeed.  The positive thesis is that judicial review is 
reasonably defensible within the terms of liberal political theory, even 
for nonpathological societies, if, but only if, a number of assumptions 
are valid. 
Waldron’s core case against judicial review rests heavily on prem-
ises and arguments suggesting that courts may be no better than legis-
latures at resolving disputes about individual rights correctly.  But the 
best outcome-based reason to support judicial review is one that Wal-
dron overlooks.  The affirmative case for judicial review need not de-
pend on the assumption that courts can identify rights more accurately 
than legislatures.  Rather, the most persuasive case maintains that both 
institutions should be enlisted in the cause of rights protection because 
it is morally more troublesome for fundamental rights to be underen-
forced than overenforced. 
Waldron’s affirmative case that judicial review is unfair and politi-
cally illegitimate also fails, and the arguments so demonstrating point 
once again to grounds of fairness and legitimacy on which judicial re-
view can be affirmatively defended.  The fairness and political legiti-
macy of procedural mechanisms depend on the ends that they serve.  
If judicial review is reasonably designed to improve the substantive 
justice of a society’s political decisions by safeguarding against viola-
tions of fundamental rights, then it is not unfair, nor is it necessarily 
politically illegitimate.  Political legitimacy can flow from multiple 
sources.  Even insofar as judicial review lacks specifically democratic 
legitimacy, the democratic character of other elements of a political re-
gime can partly compensate for this deficiency.  And a shortfall in de-
mocratic legitimacy may ultimately be outweighed, as a matter of 
overall legitimacy, by the contribution that judicial review can make to 
the protection of individual rights. 
In concluding, however, I must emphasize once more that the ar-
guments for judicial review that I have advanced in this Article are 
qualified and contingent in several ways.  The case for judicial review 
depends on a number of premises that seem to me likely to be true and 
that Waldron has not refuted, but that would be difficult and in some 
cases perhaps impossible to establish with knock-down, rationally irre-
sistible arguments.  Some of these premises are moral or conceptual, 
others empirical.  Among the important but contestable premises un-
dergirding my case for judicial review are that even if courts are not 
better overall at identifying rights violations than are legislatures, 
courts have a perspective that makes them more likely to apprehend 
serious risks to some kinds of fundamental rights; that errors that re-   
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sult in the violation of fundamental rights are typically more morally 
disturbing than errors that result in the erroneous overenforcement of 
fundamental rights; and, perhaps most crucially, that a system of judi-
cial review can be so designed that the total moral costs of the overen-
forcement of rights that judicial review would likely produce will be 
lower than the moral costs that would result from the underenforce-
ment that would occur in the absence of judicial review.  Any philoso-
phical case for judicial review, and probably against it as well, needs to 
depend on reasonable, but also perhaps reasonably contestable, prem-
ises such as these.  This is an important point in its own right, with 
which debate about judicial review needs to come to grips. 